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The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and employee fraud frequency in NGOs in Kenya. To achieve this objective the study 
used a causal explanatory design. The population was 1,700 active NGOs from which a sample 
of 234 was selected using simple random sampling. Primary data was collected through a 
structured questionnaire. The data collected was analyzed using ordinal regression model to 
test five hypothesis from the study. The study established that board size was significant in 
explaining employee fraud frequency in NGOs. The study concluded that most of the 
governance practices proposed in literature are insignificant in explaining employee fraud 
frequency. It is recommended that policy makers and the NGO coordination bureau stipulate 
the maximum board size of 10 members for NGOs.  It is further recommended that NGOs use 
other practices besides governance practices to deter employee fraud such as tone at the top, 
whistle blower policies, strong compliance programs and conducting fraud risk assessments. 
The study has contributed to current literature on governance and fraud in NGOs by 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The Nongovernmental sector in Kenya, and worldwide has been growing at an unprecedented 
rate (Kimemia, 2013). The reasons for this rapid growth include government and market failure 
in service delivery to needy areas, efficiency of NGOs in service delivery and preference of 
NGOs over government by large donor agencies like OECD, USAID and IMF (Kimemia, 
2013). The NGO sector has played a big role in supplementing government revenue both 
directly through taxes and indirectly from the revenues received, employment creation and 
service delivery to beneficiary communities.  
Despite making these contributions, there have been reports of increasing cases of fraud and 
corruption in the sector. In Kenya accounts of corruption by NGOs have been highlighted and 
reported by the media, Transparency International and government auditors (Kimemia, 2013). 
The NGO co-ordination Bureau accused NGOs in the sector report for 2015, of non-
compliance in annual reporting and fraud through maintenance of two separate books of 
accounts and unaccounted funds to the tune of 23.6 billion Kenya shilling. Incidences of fraud 
in NGOs have been blamed on poor governance and poor implementation of internal controls 
(Gibelman & Dean, 2000; Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating, 2007). NGOs with poor 
governance risk losing donor funding as evidenced by research in other countries where the 
findings indicated a relationship between good governance and increased donations (Harris, 
Petrovits, & Yetman, 2015).This can lead to loss of faith and public trust by the relevant 
stakeholders, ultimately resulting in the erosion of moral authority and legitimacy (Kimemia, 
2013). Corruption can lead to a loss of funding for the sector, ultimately resulting in the 
weakening of the NGO sector and erosion of credibility (Gibelman & Gelman, 2004). 
Corporate governance has attracted increasing attention over the past years, due to financial 
scandals from accounting irregularities (Brennan, 2008). This has increased the number of 
studies on governance, most of which have focused on companies in countries such as USA 
(Beasley, 1996; Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000), UK, Australia, China and 
Malaysia (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Farber, 2005; Shan, Graves, & Ali, 2013). These 
studies have yielded mixed results making it difficult to generalize the relationship between 
corporate governance and fraud. A study by Beasley (1996) in USA, found that firms with no-
fraud had a more independent directors on their boards. Similar findings were obtained by other 
scholars such as Chen et al. (2006), (Farber, 2005), (Uzun, Szewczyk, & Varma, 2004). On the 
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contrary, some researchers have found no relationship between some governance variables 
such as board independence, audit committee and internal audit and fraud (Agrawal & Chadha, 
2005; Shan et al., 2013). Farber (2005) found that firms which were victims of fraud later 
amended their governance system by appointing independent board members. A study in Asia 
by Chen et al., (2006), found a relationship between the incidence of fraud and some board 
features namely proportion of outside directors, number of board meetings and the tenure of 
the chairman. In contrast, a similar study by Rahmayanti & Irianto (2010) on Malaysian firms 
found no relationship between fraud and corporate governance and board characteristics except 
audit quality. The study also found that firms audited by the big four accounting firms 
experienced less fraud than their counterparts audited by other audit firms.  
The literature on nonprofits provides little guidance on the relationship between governance 
and employee fraud. This could be due to the fact that most of the researchers have studied 
governance aspects independently without linking them to fraud, but to other aspects such as 
accuracy of expenses, donations, performance and organizational efficiency (Callen, Klein, & 
Tinkelman, 2003; Harris et al., 2015; Kawira, 2012; Kimunguyi, Memba, & Njeru, 2015; 
Yetman & Yetman, 2012). Other researchers on nonprofit fraud have considered other aspects 
such as nonprofit corruption and organizational culture (Kimemia, 2013), while others have 
studied nonprofit fraud alone without linking it to governance (Archambeault, Webber, & 
Greenlee, 2014; Greenlee et al., 2007; Okaro, Okafor, & Ofoegbu, 2013). A fraud survey by 
BDO found employee fraud to be on the rise, while other surveys over the years by Association 
of Certified fraud Examiners (ACFE) indicate that occupational fraud or employee fraud is the 
most common or frequent fraud in organizations.  
Moreover, some research on governance in profit making organizations have only considered 
governance aspects narrowly by focusing on individual governance aspects such as board 
characteristics, audit committees and CEO duality (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007; Uzun et al., 
2004). A similar approach has been used by some researchers in nonprofit governance studying 
board composition, audit committees (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009; Kitching, 2009; 
Puyvelde, Caers, Bois, & Jegers, 2012). Some researchers such as Cornforth (2012) and Renz 
(2010) have raised concern on the narrow conceptualization of governance limited to board 
characteristics and proposed broadening governance to include audit and regulatory bodies.  
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1.1.1 Governance in NGOs 
Varied definitions of corporate governance have been made by different bodies and 
researchers. OECD, (2004), views corporate governance in light of relationships between a 
company’s board, stakeholders, management and shareholders. Cadbury, (2002), view 
corporate governance as the method by which companies are controlled and directed. Brigham 
and Daves (2004) view corporate governance as the rules, laws, and procedures that influence 
the operations of a company and the decisions made by its managers. The purpose of corporate 
governance in for-profit organizations is, to define the roles, responsibilities, and balance of 
power, among executives, directors, and shareholders (Ryan et al., 2010). Some researchers in 
nonprofit view governance as a set of internal and external mechanisms aimed at ensuring that 
management minimize the misuse of charitable assets, while working towards fulfilling their 
mission and fiduciary responsibilities (Harris, Petrovits, & Yetman, 2017).  
 
Some researchers in nonprofit governance argue that governance has over emphasized on board 
characteristics, thereby making the conceptualization of nonprofit governance narrow. 
(Cornforth, 2012; Stone & Ostrower, 2007). Others have dwelt on the boards role and its 
composition and how it relates with management (Cornforth, 2001; Miller-millesen, 2003). 
This they argue, has largely left out the interactions with other players such as regulatory and 
inspection groups, audit and the contribution of internal groups like members, management 
and advisory bodies towards governance functions (Cornforth, 2012). The researcher’s stress 
that nonprofit research should go beyond focus on boards.    
1.1.2 Employee Fraud Frequency 
More research has been conducted on fraud in companies as compared to that in NGOs. 
Empirical studies on fraud in companies have focused on financial statement fraud (Beasley et 
al., 2000; Bourke, 2006; Shan et al., 2013; Uzun et al., 2004), while limited studies are available 
on asset misappropriation frauds perpetrated by employees  (Harris et al., 2017; Otieno, 
Chelule, & Bor, 2014). One of the justifications for this focus on financial statement fraud is 
difficulty in measurement and identification of asset misappropriation type frauds (Tan, 
Chapple, & Walsh, 2015). A study by PriceWaterHouse in 2009 indicated that asset 
misappropriation constituted 95% of the frauds committed. A similar study in 2016 indicated 
that asset misappropriation still leads among committed frauds at 64%.  Further, a fraud survey 
by Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, (2014), indicated that asset misappropriation 
occurs in more than 83% of cases and is the most common form of occupational fraud. In this 
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case the median loss is $125,000 which is the lowest of the frauds. Other fraud surveys by firms 
such as BDO (2014) have indicated that NGOs reported more incidents of frauds involving 
employees. Even though the median loss on occupational fraud or employee fraud is low in 
comparison with financial statement fraud and corruption, this type of fraud may lead to 
cumulative high losses for an organization considering that it is the most common.  
Empirical studies on fraud in Kenya have been few, and those available have focused on the 
banking industry and county governments (Otieno et al., 2014). Fraud studies in NGOs have 
looked at corruption (Kimemia, 2013). Other accounts on fraud in NGOs have been reported 
in newspaper articles. Furthermore, the available studies have mainly focused on describing 
fraud perpetrated and characteristics of fraud commonly perpetrated in nonprofits (Harris et 
al., 2017).  
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (BDO Newzealand, 2016) classify fraud into 
three categories namely Asset misappropriation, financial statement fraud and corruption. 
Asset misappropriations are frauds perpetrated by employees by stealing or misuse of 
organization resources. They include skimming and cash larceny, frauds involving fraudulent 
disbursement of cash like billing, cheque tampering, expenses reimbursement, payroll 
inflation, tempering with cash register and assets misappropriation, like cash on hand 
misappropriation and non-cash appropriation (Otieno et al., 2014). Financial statement fraud 
involves the misstatement or omission of material information from the organizations’ financial 
reports. Corruption is defined as the misuse of public power, office or authority for private 
benefit. 
Despite the fact that frauds by employees seem to be on the rise, and that employee fraud or 
occupational fraud is the most common or frequent fraud encountered, empirical research is 
limited. The available empirical studies have not researched on employee fraud frequency and 
the fraud surveys undertaken by firms such as ACFE and BDO have been descriptive of 
occupational fraud. This leaves a knowledge gap which this study will attempt to fill. This 
study will focus on asset misappropriation fraud or employee fraud by looking at how 




1.1.3 NGOs in Kenya 
The NGO sector is large and has been growing at an average rate of 400 organizations per year 
(NGO coordination Board, 2010). There are currently approximately 8,569 NGO’s registered 
in Kenya. It is estimated that the NGO sector contributes about 130 billion Kenyan Shillings 
annually to the Kenyan economy, not to mention the other contributions in the form of 
employment creation, service delivery to beneficiary communities and tax contribution to the 
revenue authority. A report published by the NGO coordination Bureau on the state of the 
sector in 2015, claimed that 23.5 Million Kenya Shillings was unaccounted.  This implied that 
NGOs in Kenya could be fraudulent. Fraud perpetrated by staff against NGOs have been 
highlighted in the local dailies. NGOs face the challenge of whether or not to disclose the frauds 
due to fear of denting the organization image to donors and other stakeholders.    
1.2 Problem Statement 
The NGO sector has grown rapidly and many large donors have been channeling funding 
intended for various beneficiaries through them (Harris et al., 2017; Kimemia, 2013). There 
have been claims that fraud in the NGO sector prevents funding from reaching the intended 
beneficiaries, yet empirical studies on NGO fraud are few. Fraud surveys indicate that 
occupational fraud by employees occurs frequently as compared to corruption and fraud 
involving financial statements, yet studies in this area are few. Some researchers have linked 
incidences of fraud in NGOs to poor governance and poor implementation of internal controls 
(Gibelman & Dean, 2000; Greenlee et al., 2007). While a lot of research has been conducted 
on nonprofit governance, most of the research has focused on the board characteristics. Calls 
have been made to broaden nonprofit research to include other governance aspects such as 
audit and regulators. Studies in United States and UK on NGO governance have related 
governance with performance, donations, asset diversions and accuracy of charitable expenses 
(Harris et al., 2015; Yetman & Yetman, 2012). 
Studies on fraud in Kenya are limited and those available have focused on linking governance 
in NGOs with other aspects other than fraud, such as performance, organizational efficiency 
and financial performance (Kimunguyi, Memba & Njeru, 2015; Meme, 2012; Ouna, 2014). 
Other studies have focused on corporate governance and performance in other sectors such as 
in Kenyan banks (Matengo, 2008) and Kenya cooperative creameries (Mureithi, 2008). Current 
research on nonprofit fraud has not linked governance and employee fraud frequency and it is 
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not clear if there is a relationship between nonprofit governance and frequency of employee 
fraud.  
 The available studies on governance and fraud in Non-governmental organizations make it 
difficult to generalize the relationship between NGO governance and employee fraud 
frequency. Furthermore, the narrow conceptualization of governance to board characteristics 
without broadening it to other governance aspects such as audit committees, external audit 
leaves a gap which this study aims at filling. 
1.3 General Objective 
The general objective of this study was to assess the relationship between governance practices 
and employee fraud frequency in NGOs in Kenya.  
1.4 Specific Objectives 
The Specific research objectives were; 
1. To determine employee fraud frequency in NGOs in Kenya. 
2. To determine the governance practices in NGOs in Kenya. 
3. To establish the relationship between governance practices and employee fraud 
frequency in Kenyan NGOs. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This study will provide answers to the following research questions: 
1. How frequently does employee fraud occur in NGOs in Kenya? 
2. What are the governance practices among NGOs in Kenya? 
3. What is the relationship between governance practices and employee fraud frequency 
Kenyan NGOs? 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
The study focused on employee fraud or asset misappropriation as proposed by Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, (2014) and Seven corporate governance practices as proposed by 
(Cornforth, 2012; Harris et al., 2015). The population under study was 1,700 NGOs in Kenya 
which submitted annual returns to the NGO Bureau in 2016. A sample of 234 NGOs was 
selected using simple random sampling. 
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1.7 Significance of the Study 
The findings from this study will be a step towards understanding corporate governance 
practices among Kenyan NGOs and how these relate to employee fraud frequency. It will 
support the government’s efforts towards strengthening the NGO sector through the NGO 
Bureau. Kenyan NGOs have become an important development partner of the donors and the 
Kenyan government, and other stakeholders. Proper governance practices will help ensure that 
funding reaches the intended beneficiaries, thereby ensuring that the donor objectives are met. 
Failure to use good governance practices leads to misuse of funding due to fraud thereby 
negatively impacting on the NGO sector and robbing the beneficiaries and society as a whole 
of the benefits of the projects.  
This study will be useful to policy makers such as the NGO coordination bureau in terms of 
policy formulation on existing governance practices especially minimum board size for Kenyan 
NGOs and audit committees. The NGO Bureau being a body responsible for NGOs sets the 
Policy framework to improve accountability in the sector. Policy makers require information 
to enable them formulate sound policies that would enhance discipline in the sector as far as 
governance is concerned. This study will provide relevant information for policy formulation 
in the NGO sector regarding governance practices which can help deter fraud in the NGO 
sector. 
The study results will be beneficial to NGOs keen on understanding the governance practices 
that can help in curbing employee fraud. Research has shown that improving the governance 
practices in NGOs is key and is a proactive approach in dealing with employee fraud. 
The results of this study will add on the available literature on fraud and governance in NGOs 
using, as informed by agency theory and institutional theory. Students and academicians will 
find this beneficial, since the study will highlight possible research areas that can form basis 









CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review section identified and examined what has been done by other scholars 
and researchers in relation to governance and fraud. The chapter looked at the theories relating 
to governance and prior research on governance and fraud. It is organized as follows: Section 
2.2 deals with theoretical framework of governance in nonprofits, 2.3 employee fraud 
frequency and asset misappropriation in NGOs, while section 2.4 tackles governance practices 
in NGOS. Section 2.5 highlights studies on governance and fraud, Section 2.6 outlines the 
conceptual framework while Section 2.7 highlights the chapter summary and knowledge gap 
of the study. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework of Governance in Nonprofits 
Research on governance in nonprofit organizations is fairly under developed in comparison to 
research in for profit organizations (Cornforth, 2012; Harris et al., 2015; Miller-millesen, 
2003). Some researchers in nonprofit governance have used agency theory to explain board 
behavior (Callen et al., 2003; Miller-millesen, 2003), while others have used resource 
dependence theory to link and explain the dependence of nonprofit organizations on external 
resources (Heimovics, Herman, & Jurkiewicz, 1993). Others have used resource dependence 
theory on studies on executive leadership, while Stone, Hager, and Griffin, (2001), used it on 
market orientation and board structure. Trussel, Greenlee, and Brady, (2002) used resource 
dependence theory to explain financial vulnerability in nonprofits. Institutional theory has also 
been used in studies on board strategy (Parker, 2007), while Currie and Suhomlinova, (2006) 
used it on knowledge management. Some researchers have used coercive isomorphism derived 
from institutional theory to explain the pressure faced by nonprofits in conforming with legal 
requirements such as external audits (Verbruggen & Christiaens, 2011).  These studies have 
yielded mixed results due to the differences in theories applied as well as different variables 
studied.  
 
Most of the available research has conceptualized governance as fiduciary duties and 
responsibilities of the directors, following legal and corporate guidelines from agency theory 
(Carver, 1997; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Oster, 1995). Some researchers argue that these functions 
construe a narrow definition of nonprofit governance, thereby promoting the institutional 
interests of the organization over the best interests of the community. There is therefore a call 
by some researchers to broaden governance in order to include more leadership work outside 
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the boundaries of nonprofits (Chait, Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; McCambridge, 2004). Other 
researchers have emphasized that nonprofit governance should be multi theoretical in order to 
capture the key aspects of nonprofit governance (Cornforth, 2012; Stone & Ostrower, 2007; 
Tan et al., 2015). Empirical studies using multiple theories in studies on governance and 
employee fraud are limited as some of those available have used agency theory alone (Harris 
et al., 2015). The researcher used agency and institutional theory for purposes of this study, as 
these two theories both capture the monitoring and control functions of governance both within 
the organization and from external parties.  
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Many corporate governance researchers have used agency theory to explain and to provide 
solutions to the agency conflict (Beasley, 1996; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shan et al., 2013).   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) view an agency relationship as a contract where the principal 
delegates authority to make decisions to the agent. By delegating control to an agent, the 
principal expects the agent to act in a manner consistent with his or her interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Miller, 2002). Nonprofit establishments unlike profit making firms, have no 
residual owners of the assets of the entity (Callen & Tinkelman, 2014). According to Fama and 
Jensen (1983), a nonprofit entity can only survive and be successful if there is assurance that 
donations from different sources will not be expropriated but will be used effectively. The 
agency relationship typically involves some costs which Jensen and Meckling (1976) term as 
the total costs of monitoring, bonding, and residual loss. Monitoring costs are those incurred 
by the principal to limit the activities of the agent, and can be carried out by the full board, 
committees of the board and external auditors (Harris et al., 2017), or by inclusion of major 
donors on the nonprofit board (Callen et al., 2014). Agency theory propositions for nonprofit 
boards also include boards composed of non-executive or independent directors. This can 
provide assurance to donors that collusion and funding expropriation will not occur (Hough 
Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes Professor Christine Ryan, 2005). Some researchers also 
use agency theory to justify board size, arguing that larger boards are expected to be less 
effective in fulfilling the monitoring role, due to communication problems resulting from the 
unwieldy size (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).   
2.2.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory is founded on the basis that behavior in organizations is modeled by the 
institutional environment, and that organizations seek legitimacy relative to external 
constituencies. Organizations focus on improving their chance of success and survival in 
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comparison to their environment (DiMaggio &Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1987). In order to be viewed as legitimate, organizations adopt and include the values, norms, 
beliefs, and expectations of their operating environments (Andersson, 2012). Organizations 
may adopt certain actions and behaviors because they perceive them as the most common or 
accepted way of behaving (Zucker, 1987). In this light therefore, governance practices and 
structures may be adopted because they may be deemed as the correct or appropriate way of 
conducting governance. This is referred to as institutional isomorphism, which occurs through 
three different processes; coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
Coercive isomorphism results from pressures on the organization by other actors and 
organizations. These pressures make nonprofits responsive to the mandates and requirements 
of their legal environments. Law makers and government agencies not only set rules and 
monitor nonprofit behavior, but also have the capability of punishing or sanctioning 
organizations that do not comply or violate these rules. This fear of sanctions influences the 
way nonprofits act and should be considered when examining nonprofit governance 
(Andersson, 2012). In this case, nonprofit boards play a key role because they ensure that 
nonprofits fulfill their legal and ethical duties and responsibilities (Ingram, 2003). Different 
donors can be a source of coercive pressure on nonprofits (Miller-Millesen, 2003), where 
project funding is pegged on establishing specific governance practices stipulated by donors. 
The pressure to be more effective and ensure accountability has resulted in outside 
organizations trying to assess just how effective nonprofits really are. In Kenya the NGO 
coordination bureau exerts pressure on NGOs receiving more than KES 1 million from donors 
to conduct annual external audits. Audited accounts are usually submitted together with the 
annual NGO returns.   
 Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organization copies the actions, behaviors or practices 
of others they view as more legitimate or successful. Thus, NGOs may include audit 
committees in their governance practices, even though it is not a legal requirement. According 
to Miller-Millesen (2003), mimetic isomorphism offers one way to explain the growing trend 
among nonprofits to mimicking Sarbenes Oxley type governance propositions. This they 
perceive will make them more business-like and market-oriented (Andersson, 2012). 
Normative isomorphism comes from the pressure for professionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Nonprofits can gain legitimacy by adhering to and perpetuating  norms, values and 
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characteristics of good governance outlined in the normative literature or proposed by 
governance experts or consultants (Andersson, 2012). Ultimately, institutional theory suggests 
that legitimacy is the main reason for nonprofits adoption of prescriptive best practices (Miller-
millesen, 2003). Some of the best practices include establishing functional boards, internal 
audit functions and audit committees.  
This study used five governance variables as informed by agency theory; board size, board 
meeting frequency, donor presence, board independence and internal audit presence. From 
institutional theory, the study used two variables; audit quality stemming from coercive 
pressures by NGO bureau and audit committees from mimetic and normative isomorphism. 
2.3 Employee Fraud Frequency 
Fraud survey conducted by ACFE, 2016 indicates that asset misappropriation is the most 
frequent fraud perpetrated by employees, occurring in over 91% of fraud schemes. This makes 
it the most common fraud. Even though this category of fraud costs the victim organizations 
much less than other types of fraud such as bribery and corruption and financial statement 
fraud, it could lead to higher cumulative losses for victim organizations when the fraud 
frequency is high.  Empirical studies on employee fraud frequency are rare.   
 
Fraud studies in the USA have found asset misappropriation to be the most common fraud in 
charitable organizations, represented by 95% of the total frauds (Holtfreter, 2008; Greenlee et 
al., 2007). A study on fraud by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2009 indicated that Asset 
misappropriation represents 95% of the frauds committed in organizations. Similar findings 
have been found by recent fraud surveys by ACFE (2016); PWC (2016) indicating that asset 
misappropriation still represents the highest fraud experienced. Despite this fact, empirical 
studies on asset misappropriation and employee fraud frequency are fewer in comparison with 
other frauds such as financial statement fraud (Harris et al., 2017). Most of the available 
research on fraud in nonprofits is descriptive, focusing on characteristics of fraud and fraud 
perpetrators (Archambeault et al., 2014; Greenlee et al., 2007; Otieno et al., 2014). The 
available studies on asset misappropriation in for profit organizations have examined asset 
misappropriation in addition to financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996; Sharma, 2004) while 
others focused on financial statement fraud (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996; Farber, 2005). 
In the Kenyan context, studies on fraud have been conducted in relation to banks and the county 
government (Ogola, K’Aol, & Linge, 2016; Otieno et al., 2014). These studies have yielded 
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mixed results that cannot be used to generalize how governance practices relate to employee 
fraud frequency.  
Fraud against an organization can be perpetrated by individuals within or outside the 
organization. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) define occupational fraud 
as the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or 
misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets (Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners, 2014). The ACFE classify frauds into three main components, namely asset 
misappropriation (e.g., theft of cash, fraudulent disbursements, misuse of assets), corruption 
(e.g., bribery, conflicts of interest), and Financial Statement fraud (e.g., misstatement of assets, 
misstatement of revenues, improper valuations, improper disclosures).  
2.3.1 Asset Misappropriation in NGOs 
ACFE (2014) define asset misappropriation as a fraud scheme in which an employee steals or 
misuses the employing organization’s resources (e.g., theft of company cash, false billing 
schemes or inflated expense reports). Prior studies on occupational fraud indicate that the most 
commonly misappropriated asset is cash (Greenlee et al, 2007; ACFE, 2014). A study by 
Greenlee et al., (2007) on NGOs in the United States found that almost 95% of the 
misappropriated assets reported related to cash. The median loss in this case was $100,000, 
similar to noncash misappropriations. Wells (2005), identifies three main types of cash frauds. 
Skimming involves stealing cash before a record of it is made, while larceny occurs where cash 
is appropriated after recording in the books. Fraudulent disbursements involve payment of 
expenses not owed by an organization (Greenlee et al., 2007). The same study further found 
that over 75% of cash misappropriations related to fraudulent disbursements, followed by 
skimming.  
 
Researchers identify five major types of fraudulent transactions relating to disbursements: 
Fraudulent billing involves payment of false or overstated invoices. Payroll fraud takes place 
where a payroll check is issued based on inflated hours worked or the check is paid to fictitious, 
nonexistent employees. Expense repayment fraud involves payment of fictitious expense 
claims raised by employees for travel reimbursement. Check tampering fraud involves theft or 
alteration of an organization’s check; and fraudulent register disbursements involve making 
false entries in a cash register or making cash refunds from the register without documentation. 
Greenlee et al (2007) found fraudulent billing to be the most common type of fraudulent 
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disbursement. In terms of cost of fraud, register disbursements topped the list while the least 
fraudulent disbursement was expense reimbursement fraud. 
 
A similar study by Holtfreter (2008) found that most NGO frauds, at 97.7% were committed 
solely by employees or offenders within the organization.  These internal frauds included 
96.1% of cases classified as asset misappropriation and 1.6% of fraudulent statements. Only 
2.3% of the cases were classified as corruption, indicating that in this sample, detected frauds 
involving collusion between employees and those outside the organization (for example, 
vendors) were rare. A similar study on fraud in Nairobi County council revealed that 65.3% of 
committed fraud was internal while the remaining 34.7% was external fraud (Otieno et al., 
2014). The study further revealed that Bribery at 41.8% was the most committed fraud followed 
by asset misappropriation at 34.4%, financial statement fraud at 10.2%, liability and revenue 
fraud at 8.3% and disclosure fraud at 5.1%. 
 
The above studies are descriptive and focus on describing the types of fraud perpetrated against 
organizations by their employees as well as describing the characteristics of the fraud 
perpetrators. Some researchers have argued that nonprofits are particularly susceptible to asset 
misappropriation, as these organizations often lack basic controls that would help to prevent or 
detect this type of activity (Archambeault et al., 2014). These studies have not touched on 
employee fraud frequency and have resulted in mixed results. This study will focus on 13 types 
of employee or asset misappropriation frauds proposed by ACFE, 2016. These are: theft of 
cash on hand, theft of cash deposits, unrecorded sales, understated sales, forged cheques, 
payment to ghost workers, theft of inventory, theft of fixed assets, overpayment of employees, 
overstated expense reports, altered cheque payee, falsified wages, multiple expense report 
reimbursements, fraudulent invoices and personal use of organization assets e.g. vehicles. 
2.4 Governance Practices in NGOs  
Various definitions of corporate governance have been provided by different researchers. 
OECD (2004), states that corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of a company are set and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. Sir Adrian Cadbury describes 
corporate governance as the manner in which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 
2002). Brigham and Daves (2004) views governance as the set of laws, procedures and rules 
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that influence a company’s operations and the decisions made by its managers. Corporate 
governance thus relies heavily on the agency relationship in companies, with the aim of 
protecting shareholder interests and restraining opportunistic behavior by management 
(Andersson, 2012).  
According to Daily, Dalton & Cannella, (2003), corporate governance literature predominantly 
emphasizes how to protect shareholder value and restrain opportunistic behaviors where 
control and ownership of a firm are separated. Consequently, this builds on a narrow 
application. Corporate governance is also defined in terms of the economic interests of the 
participants. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) refer to corporate governance as dealing with the ways 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. This focus on an economic angle has prompted researchers to concentrate on 
agency issues and on various ways available to guard shareholders from the selfish interests of 
an organizations’ executives (Daily et al., 2003). 
Some researchers in nonprofit agencies started viewing governance as a general term for 
describing the collective and governing actions of boards of directors (Ott & Shafritz, 1986). 
Therefore from a legal standpoint, nonprofit governance focuses on how boards fulfill their 
legal and fiduciary duties (Chisolm, 1995). The agency theory perspective which is widely 
applied in the corporate governance literature concentrates on the separation between 
ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Other scholars have conceptualized nonprofit 
governance by describing and focusing on the core roles and responsibilities of the nonprofit 
board (Caers, DuBois, Jegers, Gieter, & Schepers, 2006; Miller-millesen, 2003). This over 
emphasis on nonprofit characteristics has been criticized by some researchers as overly narrow 
and consequently calls have been made to broaden nonprofit governance to include audit and 
regulatory authorities (Cornforth, 2012; Stone & Ostrower, 2007). 
Some researchers on nonprofits define governance as a set of internal and external mechanisms 
aimed at ensuring that managers work towards fulfilling their organization’s charitable mission 
and fiduciary responsibilities. This in turn minimizes the misuse of charitable assets (Harris et 
al., 2017). Cornforth (2003) views governance as the systems by which organizations are 
directed, controlled and accountable. A similar definition has been given by Hyndman (2009), 
where governance in charities is related to the way that charities are directed or controlled. 
Hyndman (2009) adds that a broader understanding of ‘governance’ includes how different 
stakeholders interact in an organization.  
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Most of the available research on nonprofit governance has focused on description of nonprofit 
board characteristics (Aggarwal, Evans, & Nanda, 2014; Andrés-Alonso & Romero-merino, 
2006, 2009; Callen et al., 2003; Steane & Christie, 2002; Stone & Ostrower, 2007). Miller-
millesen, (2003), focused on behavior, while Caers et al., 2006 studied the, relationship with 
staff and effectiveness in relation to organizational effectiveness. Many scholars have 
conceptualized nonprofit governance by describing and focusing on the core roles and 
responsibilities of the nonprofit board (Miller-millesen, 2003; Puyvelde et al., 2012).  
For purposes of this research, the definition advanced by (Harris et al., 2015) has been adopted. 
The researchers define governance as a set of internal and external mechanisms designed to 
ensure that managers are working to fulfill their organization’s charitable mission and fiduciary 
responsibilities and, in turn, to minimize the misuse of charitable assets (Harris et al., 2015). 
Therefore, for purposes of this research, the internal governance variables to be considered will 
be board composition, independence, meeting frequency, audit committees and internal audit. 
The external audit variables will be audit quality. 
2.4.1 Board Composition  
Numerous studies on corporate governance in both for profit and nonprofit organizations  have 
focused on the composition of the board (Beasley, 1996; Cornforth, 2012; Farber, 2005; Law, 
2011; Stone & Ostrower, 2007). This focus on boards has been overemphasized to the point of 
treating corporate governance as synonymous to the board (Stone & Ostrower, 2007). The 
interests of some important stakeholders such as donors should be represented on the nonprofit 
boards as well as other groups served by the charity (Cornforth, 2003). Donors are one 
important stakeholder group that may be involved in governing a charity. This may be jusified 
from an agency theory perspective, whereby donors can help monitor management to ensure 
that donations are disbursed to the correct recipients (Andrés-alonso & Romero-merino, 2009; 
Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
Another important aspect of board composition commonly considered in literature is board 
size. Some studies in profit making organizations argue that board size should not exceed ten 
members, in order to prevent the chief executive from dominating the board (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; and Jensen, 1993). In the nonprofit sector, some scholars argue that if the board 
is large, there is the risk of domination of trustees by a powerful inner core (Hyndman & 
McDonnell, 2009). The researcher perceives a powerful chief executive to be more dangerous 
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than a domination by an inner core of trustees, as chief executives are able to direct funds than 
trustees (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
A key nonprofit board function is mobilizing the required resources to enable it survive. A 
larger board may be useful where all the board members can provide contacts and networks 
that can aid in raising funds for the charity. The Charity Commission considers a board size of 
between three to nine trustees adequate, because where the board size exceeds nine members 
decision making may be difficult due to problems in communication. On the other hand, 
smaller boards have the potential of being overworked. Some charities insist on including 
various stakeholders on their boards thereby making them larger (Hyndman & McDonnell, 
2009).  
Board independence is another important aspect of corporate governance mentioned widely. 
The presence of some inside directors may be necessary for optimal strategic decision making 
if these have specific knowledge about the functioning of the organization (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Bhagat & Black, 1998). Outsiders on the other hand provide a level of 
independence necessary for monitoring management in both for-profits, and also in nonprofits 
(O’Regan & Oster, 2005). The presence of independent board members has therefore been 
used a proxy for board independence (Shan et al., 2013). 
2.4.2 Auditor Type 
Internal and external audit functions are key in helping boards fulfill their monitoring duties 
thereby by ensuring appropriate use of resources (Morgan, 2010). As opposed to research on 
corporate governance in the private sector, fewer studies have been carried out on nonprofit 
organizations on audit influence and reporting requirements. Some researchers view external 
audits as a form of external control and coercive isomorphism (Verbruggen & Christiaens, 
2011), as is the case in Kenya where NGOs are expected to conduct annual external audits and 
to submit audit reports with annual returns. Some researchers argue that audit quality is related 
to auditor reputation which in turn is related to audit firm size (De Angelo 1981; Dye 1993). 
Nonprofit studies have documented the association between audit firm size and audit quality 
(Deis and Giroux 1992, Krishnan and Schauer, 2000, and Keating et al., 2003). Other 
researchers have found a relationship between audit quality as measured by the engagement of 
big audit firms and increased donations from donors (Kitching, 2009).  
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2.4.3 Audit Committees 
The emphasis on the existence of audit committees came as a consequence of the Sarbenes 
Oxley Act of 2002 in response to accounting scandals in large companies in USA. The Act 
requires that the audit committee of publicly traded companies be responsible for appointing, 
compensating, and overseeing the auditor. The audit committee generally must include at least 
one financial expert, and may not include employees or other individuals who are paid by the 
organization for professional services. While various in depth studies on various aspects of 
audit committees have been conducted in profit making organizations (Bourke, 2006; Uzun et 
al., 2004), fewer studies on nonprofits have been conducted. This could be due to the fact that 
the adoption of audit committees in nonprofits is not a mandatory requirement as is the case in 
companies. Some of the studies on companies have found a positive relationship between 
various aspects of audit committees such as size, independence, meeting frequency and 
financial expertise with reduced incidents of fraud (Farber, 2005; Shan et al., 2013; Thiravudi, 
2010; Uzun et al., 2004). Nonetheless, nonprofits in the USA are expected to disclose their 
governance policies annually while reporting to the tax body IRS (Harris et al., 2015). Even 
though Kenyan NGOs are not required to report on their governance structure, the use of audit 
committees is recommended for good practice. Some researchers (Harris et al., 2017) argue 
that the use of an audit committee in nonprofits can help ensure that the external auditor is 
competent and independent and that the overall quality of the audit is acceptable. Other 
researchers have found no relationship between audit committee presence and internal controls 
in NGOs (Al-Moataz, E. S., & Basfar, 2010). 
2.5 Governance and Employee Fraud Frequency 
Most of the empirical studies linking corporate governance and fraud have been conducted in 
profit making organizations (Beasley et al., 2000; Bourke, 2006; Chen et al., 2006; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2007; Law, 2011; Shan et al., 2013; Uzun et al., 2004). Similar research in 
nonprofit organizations has been limited, yet good governance practices have been proposed 
as a solution to fraud in nonprofits. Some of the studies in nonprofits have focused on linking 
different governance variables to donations (Harris et al., 2015; Kitching, 2009), organization 
performance (Andersson, 2012; Kawira, 2012; Stone & Ostrower, 2007; Szekendi et al., 2014), 
and financial performance (Aggarwal, Evans, & Nanda, 2014; Kimunguyi et al., 2015). Others 
have linked governance with accountability (Coule, 2015; Jepson, 2005; Jordan & van Tuijl, 
2012; Reiser & Kelly, 2011) and efficiency (Callen et al., 2003; Ouna, 2014). A study 
conducted in USA on governance and asset diversions by (Harris et al., 2017), found a positive 
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relationship between fraud occurrence and four of the eleven governance aspects studied 
namely monitoring by debt holders and government grantors, audits, and keeping managerial 
duties in-house. The above studies have made conflicting findings and studies relating 
corporate governance practices with employee fraud frequency are scarce. The studies might 
be few because NGOs tend not to disclose fraud for fear of loss of credibility and funding. 
2.5.1 Board Characteristics and Employee Fraud Frequency 
Various researchers in the profit making sector have highlighted the role of the board of 
directors as a mechanism for internal governance in preventing fraud (Rezaee, 2005; Shan et 
al., 2013). Agency theory and contractual literature assert that some board features such as size, 
composition, internal structure, and founders’ commitment help in guaranteeing the efficiency 
of nonprofit organizations (Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003; Herman & Renz, 2000, 2004). 
Some researchers in profit making organizations have found a strong relationship between an 
independent board and corporate fraud  
(Beasley, 1996; Chen et al., 2006; Farber, 2005; Uzun et al., 2004). Independent directors play 
a key part in monitoring any fraudulent behavior by executive directors which can reduce the 
likelihood of fraud (Beasley, 1996; Uzun et al., 2004). Studies in nonprofit governance have 
yielded conflicting results with some indicating no relationship between board characteristics 
and organizational efficiency (Andrés-alonso & Romero-merino, 2006; Harris et al., 2015; 
Miller, 2002). A Kenyan study on Somali NGOs by Meme (2012), found a weak positive 
relationship between board characteristics and NGO performance. Agency theory advocates 
for proper monitoring of the board by including some independent members on the board.  
Even though nonprofit organizations do not have legal owners, other constituencies mainly 
large donors are significantly interested in the efficient use of the nonprofit organizations’ 
resources (Callen & Tinkelman, 2014). The presence of active donors who provide large 
quantities of resources to an organization may favor the monitoring of management behavior 
and may have enough power and access to information to become efficient monitors (Frumkin 
& Kim, 2001; Herman & Renz, 2000; O’Regan & Oster, 2002). Hansmann (1980) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983), taking the agency perspective, propose that major donors serve as effective 
monitors of nonprofits. Callen et al. (2003) provide evidence in favor of the relationship 
between having major donors on a nonprofit board and effective board monitoring.  
Board size is another characteristic that has been considered in corporate governance studies. 
Some prior studies in profit making organizations suggested that large boards increase the 
likelihood of fraud as a blotted board may become ineffective in monitoring management. This 
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may make it easier for the Chief Executive to control the board (Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 
2000; Lei & Song, 2012). Other studies suggest that too many board members cause 
communication problems in terms of coordination, and decision making, resulting in less 
efficient managerial monitoring (Eisemberg, Sundgren, &Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996). These 
problems have also been observed in nonprofit boards of trustees (Callen et al., 2003; O’Regan 
& Oster, 2005). A study by Yermack (1996) showed an inverse relation between board size 
and firm performance in for-profit firms, and concluded that smaller boards are more effective 
in monitoring the firm, from an agency perspective. Similar studies by Bradshaw et al. (1992) 
found board size to have little power in explaining differences in growth in budgets. Cornforth 
(2001) did not find board size to be significantly related to board effectiveness. From the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis on board size can be derived: 
 
H1: The size of the board is positively related to employee fraud frequency. 
The frequency of board meetings is another board characteristic that has been emphasized in 
studies in profit making organizations. The board meeting frequency is often related to how 
active and vigilant the company board members are (Shan et al., 2013). Since it is difficult to 
measure activity or vigilance, the frequency of board meetings is used to measure board 
activity. Some researchers such as Chen et al. (2006), argue that boards may meet more 
frequently when organizations face financial distress or when controversial decisions need to 
be made. A study by Shan et al. (2013), found a positive relation between board meetings and 
fraud occurrence in Malaysian companies. Other researchers have found no association 
between board meeting frequency and performance of Malaysian co-operatives (Othman et al., 
2016). The above studies shed little light on the relationship between board meeting frequency 
and employee fraud frequency. The following hypothesis on frequency of board meetings can 
be made: 
 
H2: The frequency of board meetings is positively related to employee fraud frequency. 
2.5.2 Auditor Type and Employee Fraud Frequency 
External audits are used by boards to monitor and management from agency theory perspective, 
and are also considered by institutional theory as means used by donors and other regulatory 
bodies to coerce organizations to be diligent and accountable in use of funds.  
Prior studies on audit quality and fraud in profit making firms have yielded mixed results. A 
study by Ramayanti & Irianto (2009) found a relationship between audit quality and presence 
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of fraud in Indonesian firms. On the contrary some studies have found no relationship between 
audit quality and fraud (Law, 2011; Shan et al., 2013). In Kenya, NGOs audits are compulsory 
and audited reports are required when submitting annual returns to the NGO co-ordination 
bureau. 
Some scholars have argued that big audit firms can provide higher-quality audits since they 
possess a higher degree of independence and expertise. They are therefore better placed to 
monitor the business of a company (Bourke, 2006; Farber, 2005; Shan et al., 2013). Other 
studies suggest that the use of high-quality auditors is associated with high quality financial 
statements (Lennox, 2010). Other scholars are of the view that firms with weak internal 
corporate governance mechanisms cover up management’s opportunistic behavior by choosing 
lower-quality auditors, who are inexperienced or lack independence (Lin & Liu, 2009). Auditor 
size has been used as a common measure of auditor quality and has been found to be positively 
associated with a wide variety of financial reporting quality measures (Lennox, 2010; Lin & 
Liu, 2009; Shan et al., 2013). There are fewer papers in the nonprofit setting, though some 
evidence suggests an inverse relation between auditor size and client internal control problems 
(Coram, Ferguson, & Moroney, 2006). On the contrary, other researchers have found a positive 
relationship between auditor size and increased donor funding (Kitching, 2009). It is difficult 
to generalize the relationship between auditor type and employee fraud frequency from these 
studies. From the arguments above, the following hypothesis on audit quality can therefore be 
made: 
H3: The use of the Big Four audit firms is negatively related to employee fraud frequency.  
2.5.3 Audit Committees 
The existence of audit committees has grown in current years due to loss of trust in accounting 
firms which led to collapse of big companies such as Enron. Prior studies have found an 
association between the effectiveness of audit committees and governance in an organization. 
A Canadian study by Goh (2009) found an association between audit committee independence 
and timeliness in remedies in material internal control weaknesses, thereby improving financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance. Some studies on audit committees and financial 
expertise have yielded mixed results (Mustafa & Ben Youssef, 2010). In the United States, 
Mustafa and Meier (2006) found that the greater the effectiveness of the AC, the higher the 
percentage of independent members and the longer the average tenure of AC members, the 
lower the incidence of misappropriation of assets. In Australia, Chapple et al. (2007) also found 
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that the proportion of independent directors on the Audit Committee is inversely related to asset 
misappropriation. Another study found no association between audit committee presence in 
nonprofits and internal control weaknesses related to financial reporting (Al-Moataz, E. S., & 
Basfar, 2010). It is difficult to make generalizations and draw conclusions from the above 
studies on how audit committee presence relates to employee fraud frequency. The following 
hypothesis can be made from the discussion above: 
 
H4: The presence of audit committee is negatively related to employee fraud frequency.  
2.5.4 Internal Audit Function 
Internal audit has been key in monitoring the behavior of management from an agency 
perspective. Research has also shown that an effective internal audit function plays a vital role 
in corporate governance (Karagiorgos, Drogalas, Gotzamanis, & Tampakoudis, 2010). 
Regulators and professional bodies have recognized the value of the internal audit function 
within the corporate governance structure. The Treadway Commission (1987) identified 
internal audit as a function that is critical to the integrity of financial reporting. Similarly, the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 1993) and the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
likewise noted the importance of the internal auditor’s responsibility for deterring and detecting 
fraud.  
 
Even though the benefits of internal auditing are widely accepted, there are fewer studies on 
the role of internal auditing on firm performance (Hutchinson & Zain, 2009). Some researchers 
imply that the internal audit department quality is more important than mere existence of an 
internal audit department. Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) found no significant 
relation between voluntarily establishing an internal audit function and a decrease in of 
discretionary accruals levels. The professional literature views both accounting qualifications 
as well as prior auditing experience of the internal audit staff as key requirements if the internal 
audit function is to be effective (Hutchinson & Zain, 2009). In nonprofit organizations, the 
internal audit function has been left out in some cases due to funding constraints. The following 
hypothesis on internal audit can be made as follows: 
 
H5: The existence of an internal audit function is negatively associated with employee 




2.6 Conceptual Framework 
In this study, employee fraud frequency is the dependent variable, while seven governance 
practices are the independent variables. Corporate governance is represented by Seven 
independent variables namely Board size, board meeting frequency, board independence, 
donor presence, audit quality, audit committees and internal audit. This is represented in the 
following diagram. 
 






Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
Different scholars have advanced different theories to address the issue of corporate 
governance, with agency theory being the most common theory. Some scholars have advocated 
for the use of multiple theories in governance research (Cornforth, 2012; Stone & Ostrower, 
2007). While multiple theories have been used in empirical studies on nonprofit governance 
and other aspects such as board composition and performance, compliance and financial 
reporting, a gap still exists due to the limited studies using multiple theories to relate 
governance and fraud. Never the less, various scholars have continually underscored the 
importance of corporate governance in both for profit and nonprofit making organizations 
(Archambeault et al., 2014; Labelle et al., 2007). Many studies in profit making organizations 
have indicated a high probability of fraud occurrence in organizations with poor governance 
practices. The available empirical studies linking several governance practices to fraud cannot 
be used to explain governance practices and employee fraud frequency in nonprofit 
organizations. This study has identified this research gap and has attempted to fill it. 
 
Corporate Governance 
1. Board characteristics  
2. Auditor type 
3. Audit committees  
4. Internal audit 
Employee Fraud 
frequency 
Measured by employee 






Dependent Variable Moderating Variables 
23 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design used by the researcher, data collection, the 
population studied, and sampling method, type of data collected, data analysis and the 
reliability and validity of the data. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 covers 
the Research philosophy, 3.3 research design, 3.4 Population and sampling techniques, and 
3.5 covers data collection techniques. Section 3.6 covers Operationalization of variables, 
section 3.7 data analysis techniques, section 3.8 Data reliability and validity while section 
3.9 covers Ethical considerations. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy refers to a system of beliefs and assumptions about the development 
of knowledge. Well thought out and consistent research assumptions are important in 
designing a coherent research project. In this case, all the research elements in terms of 
choice of method, research strategy, data collection and analysis techniques should all fit 
together. Each stage in the research process involves making some assumptions (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). These include epistemological assumptions, which relate to assumptions 
about human knowledge, or ontological assumptions about the realities encountered in 
research. There are also axiological assumptions which relate to the extent and ways the 
research process is influenced by the researchers’ values (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2009).  
There are five major philosophies used in business and management. These are positivism, 
critical realism, interpretivism, postmodernism and pragmatism. The argument underlying 
Positivism and realism is that the social world can be studied according to the same 
principles as the natural sciences. On the contrary, interpretivism argues that the principles 
of natural sciences cannot be used to study the social world (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
positivist assumption is that objective facts offer the best scientific evidence, hence this 
approach is likely to result in the choice of quantitative research methods. Therefore, 
research objectives are likely to be considered objective and generalizable.   
This study followed the positivist approach and Epistemology. This involves the use of the 
scientific method, based on measurable facts by way of the dependent and independent 
variables. Law like generalizations by way of five hypotheses were used, and a causal 
prediction and explanation of the relationship between governance and employee fraud 
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frequency was made. The deductive method was used as well as quantitative techniques in 
data analysis.  
3.3 Research Design 
A causal explanatory research design was used in order to explain the relationship between 
the independent and the dependent variables. An explanatory research design is one that 
shows the relationship between dependent and one or more independent variables (Kothari, 
2004). The dependent variable in this study was the employee fraud frequency while the 
independent variables were seven corporate governance practices. 
3.4 Population and Sampling Techniques 
The study targeted a total of 1,700 active NGOs which submitted annual returns to the NGO 
bureau in 2016, as the list for 2017 was not available when the data collection was 
commenced.  A sample consisting of 234 NGOs was selected from the population based 
on a 90% confidence level and 5% margin of error as proposed by Cooper & Schindler 
(2011). In order to determine the sample size using simple random sampling, some 
researchers propose the use of census for small populations, imitating a sample size of 
similar studies, using published tables, and applying formulas to calculate a sample size 
(Israel, 1992; Kothari, 2004). Other researchers have used similar sampling methods in 
obtaining the sample size (Kawira, 2012; Kimunguyi et al., 2015). 
Simple random sampling technique was used in sample selection, as it gave each NGO on 
the population an equal chance of selection. According to Cooper & Schindler (2011), 
simple random sampling has the advantage of being easy to implement due to the use of 
computerized random digits. The list of NGOs provided by the NGO coordination bureau 
indicated that several NGOs implemented projects belonging to multiple sectors thereby 
making it challenging to use stratified sampling. The sample was drawn easily using 
random numbers in Excel from a list of 1,700 NGOs constituting the population obtained 
from the NGO coordination bureau.  Some NGOs were untraceable and were therefore 
replaced by the next one on the list.  
3.5 Data Collection Technique 
The study relied on primary data that was collected through the administration of a 
structured questionnaire. Structured questionnaires are the most appropriate data collection 
instrument due to the relative ease of administering and cost effectiveness to the researcher.  
According to Kothari (2004) questionnaires have the advantage of being free from 
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interviewer bias and answers are in respondents’ own words. Respondents also have 
adequate time to give well thought out answers. Questionnaires were also simple and quick 
for the respondent to complete as the respondents remain anonymous. The Likert scale has 
the advantage of being quick and easy to construct, are more reliable and provide greater 
volume of data (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). Kothari (2004) points out the main demerits 
of use of the questionnaires as low rate of return of the duly filled in questionnaires. There 
is also the possibility of ambiguous replies or omission of replies altogether to certain 
questions thus making interpretation of omissions is difficult. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
know whether willing respondents are truly representative and the method is likely to be 
the slowest of all. 
The questionnaires were administered using “drop and pick” method as well as snowballing 
through email. The questionnaire was divided into 4 sections. Section A elicited 
information on the organization background in terms of the number of years of operation 
in Kenya, whether local or international NGO, sector of operation and employment level 
of the person filling the questionnaire. Section B sought information necessary to answer 
objective 1 on the frequency of 13 types of frauds faced by Kenyan NGOs. The fraud 
frequency was categorized into 5; monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually and none. 
Section C sought to answer objective 2 by seeking information on the corporate governance 
practices relevant to this study namely board size, board independence, donor presence, 
board meeting frequency, audit quality, audit committees and internal audit. Objective 3 on 
the relationship between corporate governance practices and employee fraud frequency was 
answered using ordinal regression. The targeted respondents were senior managers. A 
sample of the questionnaire is on appendix I. 
3.6 Operationalization of Variables 
The Three objectives in the study were measured as follows: 
Objective 1 on the frequency of employee fraud in NGOs in Kenya was achieved by 
considering the frequency of 13 different types of occupational frauds proposed by ACFE, 
2016. Objective 2 on the corporate governance practices in NGOs was answered by using 
7 corporate governance practices mentioned widely in literature. These are board size, 
board independence, board meeting frequency, donor presence, and audit committee 
presence, big 4 audit firm use and existence of internal audit. Objective 3 on the relationship 
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between employee fraud frequency and corporate governance practices was achieved using 
an ordinal regression analysis. The variables are defined in figure 1 below. 
The ordinal repression model is as follows: 
Logit [P(y<= j)] = αj + β1OUT + β2BOARDSIZE + β3MEETING + β4DONOR+   
β5TOP4 + β6AUDCOMMIT + β7INTAUD + Ԑit 
Where: 
1. Y – Represents the employee fraud frequency measured by fraud occurrence in 6 levels 
denoted by j, up to j-1. 
2. αj denotes the intercept equivalent for the each level of employee fraud frequency. 
3. β1OUT – represents the coefficient for outside directors on the BOD. 
4. β2BOARDSIZE – represents the coefficient for the number of board members on the 
BOD. 
5. β3MEETING – represents the coefficient for number of board meetings per year. 
6. β4DONOR – represents the coefficient for donor presence on the BOD. 
7. β5TOP4 – indicates coefficient for auditor type, based on whether the organization 
uses the top 4 audit firms represented by value 1 or if not represented by value 0.  
8. β6AUDCOMMIT – represents the coefficient for presence of audit committees. 









Fraud occurrence monthly (5), quarterly 
(4), semi-annually (3), annual (2) and 
none (1) basis. 
Independent 
variables 
Board size  Number of board members 
Board meeting 
frequency 
Number of meetings per year 
Board 
independence 
Presence of external board members 
Donor presence Presence of donors on BOD 
Auditor type  Use of Big 4 auditors 
Audit committees  Presence of audit committee. 
Internal audit  Presence of internal auditor/ internal 
audit department. 
 
Table 3.1: Operationalization of variables 
3.6.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the study was employee fraud frequency, which was measured by 
the occurrence of 13 types of fraud. The variable employee fraud frequency was measured on 
an ordinal scale using 6 points with the highest frequency taking a value of 6 and the lowest 
frequency a value of 1. Where fraud occurred monthly a value of 5 was assigned, quarterly a 
value of 4, semi-annually a value of 3, annually a value of 2 and no fraud a value of 1.      
3.6.2 Independent Variables 
Seven independent variables representing corporate governance practices in NGOs were 
considered. These corporate governance variables include board size, board independence, 
board meetings, donor presence, audit committee presence, internal audit presence and the 
quality of auditors. The variable board independence was measured by the presence of 
independent or outside directors on the BOD and is a categorical variable. Board size relates 
to the number of directors on the board, and is grouped into 3 categories. Board meeting 
frequency is measured by the number of board meetings held by an NGO per year and is a 
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continuous variable. Auditor type is measured by the use or not of the big 4 audit firms and is 
a categorical variable. Internal audit presence represents the variable internal audit. Where 
internal audit function exists, the variable has been coded as 1 and 0 where there is none.  
3.7 Data Analysis Technique 
Descriptive statistical measures were used to summarize data for objective 1 and 2.The results 
for objective 1 were analyzed using percentages and results presented in frequency tables. 
Objective 2 was similarly analyzed using percentages for the closed ended questions and mean 
and standard deviations for Likert questions. These were presented using frequency tables.  
Ordinal regression was used to analyze and answer objective 3 on the relationship between 
corporate governance practices and employee fraud frequency. The quality of the regression 
model was tested using the goodness of fit coefficients, namely chi-square and Nagel Kerke.  
3.8 Data Reliability and Validity 
Cooper et al (2011) note that the accuracy of data to be collected largely depends on the data 
collection instruments validity and reliability. For this research, a pilot study was conducted. 
The questionnaire was shared with 5 respondents from NGOs and later refined to ensure 
reliability and validity.  
Cronbach alpha was computed for the Likert questions involving fraud, board features and 
Audit committee features. The initial results obtained were 0.698, 0.326 and 0.775 respectively.  
The alpha value for audit committee questions was above the required value of 0.7, thus 
indicating that the questions were reliable. To improve the alpha value for Likert questions on 
fraud and board features, the correlation matrix was used to identify and eliminate questions 
where the values were low. One question was removed from the fraud likert relating to the age 
of the fraud perpetrators and hence the value of the Cronbach alpha increased to 0.71.  For the 
questions on board features, questions relating to links with donors and gender of the board 
members were removed. The alpha value improved to 0.705. 
3.9 Ethical Considerations 
The aspect of ethical consideration was taken care of in this research by notifying the 
respondents that all the information they provide would be treated confidentiality. Any 
information collected was used solely for research and no other purposes. In addition, the 
names of the respondent organizations was not requested in the questionnaire thereby 
maintaining confidentiality.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives details of information processed from data collected from this study on 
Assessment of the relationship between corporate governance practices and employee fraud 
frequency in NGOs in Kenya. The sample consisted of 234 NGOs in Kenya. The data was 
gathered exclusively using questionnaire as the research tool using closed ended and Five point 
Likert scale. The chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 reports the response rate, 4.3 
summarizes the demographic information of the respondents and 4.4 details the results on 
employee fraud frequency. Section 4.5 summarizes the results on governance practices in 
NGOs while section 4.6 deals with regression analysis on the relationship between employee 
fraud frequency and corporate governance practices. 
4.2 Response Rate 
The study targeted 234 NGOs and a total of 234 questionnaires were sent out. Data collection 
was conducted over a period of 6 months, and it took long to obtain responses since many 
NGOs declined to fill in the questionnaires and had to be replaced by new ones. 70 valid 
questionnaires were received representing a 29.9% response rate. 5 questionnaires were invalid 
as not all the questions were answered. The sensitivity of the topic had an impact on the 
response rate, since many NGOs may not be willing to disclose fraud in their organizations. 
The questionnaire had been pilot tested and shared with 10 NGOs from which 5 responded. 
This response of 50% was sufficient for the study. 
4.3 Demographic Information 
The study sought to establish basic information about the respondent organizations namely the 
number of years in operation, whether the organization was a local or international NGO and 
the main sector of operation. Majority of the respondent organizations represented by 65.7% 
have been in operation for more than 16 years. This was followed by 15.7% that have been in 
operation for 6 to 10 years and 12.9% that have been in operation for 11 to 15 years. The 
remaining 5.7 % have been in operation for 5 years and below. The results are summarized in 






 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
0-5 Years 4 5.7 5.7 
6-10 years 11 15.7 21.4 
11-15 years 9 12.9 34.3 
16 years and 
above 
46 65.7 100.0 
Total 70 100.0  
Table 4.1: Years of operation 
 
Many of the respondent organizations were International NGOs representing 64.3%, while 
the remaining 35.7% were local NGOs, as represented in the table below. 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Local NGO 25 35.7 35.7 
International 
NGO 
45 64.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0  
Table 4.2: Type of organization 
 
From the respondents, 22.86% belonged to multiple sectors and had projects in Health, 
Education and youth, Democracy and governance and Agriculture. 22.86% were from the 
Health sector while 22.85% belonged to other sectors specifically elderly persons, capacity 
building, research, orphans, peace and conflict resolution and humanitarian and advocacy 
sectors. 14.29% of the respondents were from Education and Youth. 10% were from 
Agriculture, Business & Education sector, while Democracy and governance constituted 
5.71%. Natural Resource and management were represented by the lowest number of 










 N=70 n Percent Cumulative Percent 
Health 16 22.86% 22.86% 
Democracy & Governance 4 5.71% 28.57% 
Education & Youth 10 14.29% 42.86% 
Agriculture, Business & 
Environment 
7 10% 52.86% 
Natural Resource 
management 
1 1.43% 54.29% 
Other 16 22.86% 77.15% 
Multiple sectors 16 22.85% 100% 
Total 70 100.0 
 
Table 4.3: Respondents by sector 
From the respondent NGOs, 72.9% were in management while the remaining 27.1% were 
drawn from non-managerial positions. The study targeted Finance managers in NGOs, but 
since some of them were unavailable other managers filled in some of the questionnaires. 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Other 19 27.1 27.1 
Management 51 72.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0  
Table 4.4: Respondent employment level  
4.4 Employee Fraud Frequency 
In order to assess the frequency of employee fraud, 13 different frauds were considered at 6 
different frequencies multiple, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually and none. The 
scores for employee fraud frequency from 6 for multiple frequency to 1 where there was no 
fraud. This is as summarized in the section below. 
A total of 57 NGOs representing 81.43% reported fraud at varying frequencies, while the 
remaining 18.57% reported none. Nine organizations representing 12.9% reported fraud 
frequency on a monthly basis, five representing 7.1% of the respondents reported fraud 
frequency on a quarterly basis. One organization representing 1.4% of the respondents reported 
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semi-annual fraud frequency while five representing 7.1% of the respondents reported annual 
fraud frequency. Majority of the respondents at 52.8% reported multiple frauds occurring at 




None 13 18.6 
Monthly 9 12.9 
Quarterly 5 7.1 
Semi-annually 1 1.4 
Annually 5 7.1 
Multiple 37 52.8 
Total 70 100% 
Table 4.5: Employee fraud frequency 
 
The most frequently occurring fraud was personal use of organization assets by 76% of the 
respondents. Under this category, 28 respondents at 40% reported monthly fraud frequency, 15 
respondents at 21% reported quarterly fraud frequency while 4 respondents at 6% reported 
semi-annual fraud frequency. 6 respondents at 9% reported annual fraud frequency.  
Inventory theft was the second most frequent fraud at 44%.  8 respondents at 11% reported 
monthly fraud frequency, 6 respondents at 9% reported quarterly fraud frequency while 10 
respondents at 14% reported semi-annual fraud frequency. 7 respondents at 10% reported 
annual fraud frequency.  
Overstated expense report was the second most frequent fraud at 14% followed closely by 
expense report fraud at 13%. Inventory theft and fraudulent invoices followed at 11% and 9% 
respectively. Cash theft, fixed assets theft and altered cheque payee were next at 4%. Deposit 
theft, forged cheques, payroll fraud and employee overpayment were reported by 1% of the 
respondents as occurring monthly, while falsified wages was not reported by any respondent. 
For the frauds that were reported as occurring quarterly, personal asset use was reported by 
21% of the respondents, followed by inventory theft and overstated expense reports as reported 
by 9% of the respondents. Expense report fraud was reported by 6%, while cash theft was 
reported by 3% of the respondents. Forged cheques and fraudulent invoices were each reported 
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by 1% of the respondents, while. Deposit theft, payroll fraud, fixed asset theft, employee 
overpayment, altered payee and falsified wages were not reported by any of the respondents. 
Inventory theft was reported semiannually by 14% of the respondents, followed by expense 
report fraud and cash theft as reported by 10% and 9% of the respondents respectively. Falsified 
wages were reported by 7% of the respondents, while fraudulent invoices and personal asset 
use were each reported by 6% of the respondents as occurring semiannually. Overstated 
expense reports was reported semiannually by 4%, while deposit theft, payroll fraud and 
employee overpayment were reported by 3%, 1% and 1% respectively. Forged cheques, fixed 
assets theft and altered payee were not reported by any respondent on a semiannual basis. 
Fixed assets theft was reported by 14% of the respondents with an annual occurrence, while 
cash theft was reported by 10% of the respondents. 10% of the respondents reported inventory 
theft, employee overpayment, overstated expense reports and expense report fraud annually. 
9% of the respondents reported fraudulent invoices, and personal asset use annually. Payroll 
fraud, falsified wages, cash theft and altered payee were reported by 7%, 6%, 4% and 3% of 
the respondents with an annual occurrence. Forged cheques was not reported as occurring 
annually by any of the respondents.  
Fraud relating to forged cheques was the least reported fraud as 97% of the respondents did not 
encounter this fraud. This was followed by altered cheque payee, deposit theft and payroll fraud 
as reported by 93%, 91% and 90% of the respondents respectively. Personal asset use and 
inventory theft were the most frequently reported frauds as reported by 76% and 44% 
respectively. 












N=70 n % n % n % n % n % 
Cash theft 3 4% 2 3% 6 9% 10 14% 49 70% 
Deposit theft 1 1% 0 0% 2 3% 3 4% 64 91% 
Forged Cheques 1 1% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 68 97% 
Payroll Fraud 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 5 7% 63 90% 
Inventory Theft 8 11% 6 9% 10 14% 7 10% 39 56% 
Fixed asset theft 3 4% 0 0% 0 0% 11 16% 56 80% 
Employee overpayment 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 7 10% 61 87% 
Overstated expense report 10 14% 6 9% 3 4% 7 10% 44 63% 
Altered Payee 3 4% 0 0% 0 0% 2 3% 65 93% 
Falsified wages 0 0% 0 0% 5 7% 4 6% 61 87% 
Expense report fraud 9 13% 4 6% 7 10% 7 10% 43 61% 
Fraudulent Invoices 6 9% 1 1% 4 6% 6 9% 53 76% 
Personal asset use 28 40% 15 21% 4 6% 6 9% 17 24% 
 
Table 4.6: Employee fraud frequency by fraud type 
 
The study results found that NGOs that have been in operation for 5 years experienced 
employee fraud quarterly (25%), monthly (25%) and multiple frequencies (50%). Those that 
have been in operation for 6-10 years experienced employee fraud, monthly (18.2%) and 
multiple frequencies (54.5%).  NGOs that have been in operation for 11-15 years experienced 
employee fraud quarterly (11.1%) and multiple frequencies (77.8%). Those in operation for 16 
years and above experienced employee fraud annually (10.9%), semi-annually (2.2%), 
quarterly (6.5%), monthly (13%) and multiple frequencies (47.8%). The results imply that the 












N = 70 

















n 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 
%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
6-10 
years 
n 3 0 0 0 2 6 11 
%  27.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.2% 54.5% 100.0% 
11-15 
years 
n 1 0 0 1 0 7 9 





n 9 5 1 3 6 22 46 
%  19.6% 10.9% 2.2% 6.5% 13.0% 47.8% 100.0% 
Total 
n 13 5 1 5 9 37 70 
%  18.6% 7.1% 1.4% 7.1% 12.9% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Table 4.7: Employee fraud frequency by years in operation 
 
The study findings indicated that 72% of the Local NGOs experienced employee fraud multiple 
times, 8% monthly and 4% quarterly. 52.9% of the International NGOs experienced employee 
fraud multiple times, 12.9% monthly, 7.1% quarterly, 1.4% semiannually and 18.6% annually. 
These results imply that local NGOs experience employee fraud more frequently than the 


























Local NGO n 4 0 0 1 2 18 25 




n 9 5 1 4 7 19 45 
% 20.0% 11.1% 2.2% 8.9% 15.6% 42.2% 100.0
% 
Total 
n 13 5 1 5 9 37 70 
%  18.6% 7.1% 1.4% 7.1% 12.9% 52.9% 100.0
% 
 
Table 4.8: Employee fraud frequency by organization type 
 
From the Likert scale responses, most of the respondents agreed with the statement that cash 
is the most commonly misappropriated asset with a mean of 3.78 and a standard deviation of 
1.247. The low standard deviation indicates that most if the responses were close to the mean 
and not dispersed. One respondent did not answer this question. The question of whether male 
employees commit more frauds than their female counterparts resulted in a mean value of 3.24 
indicating neutral position by the respondents with a standard deviation of 1.028. The low 
standard deviation indicated that most of the responses were close to the mean. Similarly, the 
respondents were neutral as to whether senior level employees commit more frauds than junior 
staff from the mean value of 3.00 and standard deviation of 1.022. As to whether most frauds 
are committed by accounting staff than non-accounting staff, the respondents disagreed with 






 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Cash is the most commonly 
misappropriated asset 
69 1 5 3.78 1.247 
Male employees commit more frauds 
than their female counterparts 
70 1 5 3.24 1.028 
Senior level employees commit more 
frauds than junior staff 
70 1 5 3.00 1.022 
Most frauds are committed by 
accounting staff than non-accounting 
staff 
70 1 5 2.80 1.071 
Table 4.9: Employee fraud Likert responses 
4.5 Corporate Governance Practices 
The study sought responses from NGOs on the corporate governance practices currently in 
place. Specifically, the governance practices under consideration were board size and 
composition, board meeting frequency, audit committee presence and composition, audit 
quality and internal audit. The results are summarized in the section below. 
4.5.1 Board Size and Composition 
A third of the respondents at 34.3% indicated that they had boards composed of 11-15 
members, while 30% indicated a board size of 6-10 members. This was followed by boards 
with 2-5 members, representing 25.7%. 7 respondents representing 10% had large boards with 
more than 16 members. The results indicate that 55.7% of the respondent NGOs have small 
boards with 2-10 members, while 44.3% have large boards consisting of 11 members and 

















21 30.0 55.7 
11-15 
members 
24 34.3 90.0 
16 members 
and above 
7 10.0 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
Board 
independence 
None 3 4.3 4.3 
2-5 
members 
41 58.6 62.9 
6-10 
members 
14 20.0 82.9 
11-15 
members 
12 17.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
Donor presence 
None 41 58.6 58.6 
2-5 
members 
23 32.9 91.4 
6-10 
members 
4 5.7 97.1 
11-15 
members 
2 2.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
 
Table 4.10: Board size and composition 
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More than half of the respondent NGOs at 58.6% had between 2-5 independent board members 
followed by 20% that had 6-10 members. Another 17.1% had 11-15 independent board 
members while the remaining 4.3% had no independent board members. The results indicate 
that majority of the respondents NGOs have independent boards with at least 2 members and 
at most 15 members. This is summarized in table 4.10 above. 
 
Many of the respondents had no donor representation on the boards representing 58.6%. 23 
respondents representing 32.9% had 2-5 donors present on the BOD while 4 representing 5.7% 
had between 6-10 members. The remaining 2.9% had between 11-15 donors represented on the 
BOD. The results imply that majority of the respondent NGOs have no donors on their boards 
of directors. Table 4.10 summarizes this information.  
 
From the respondents, 47.1% indicated that the board meets quarterly, followed by 32.9% 
where boards meet semi-annually. 14.3% of them indicated an annual meeting frequency, while 
one respondent representing 1.4% indicated that the board meets thrice a year. The results 
indicate an average meeting frequency of quarterly to semiannually for the respondent NGOs. 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Once a year 10 14.3 14.3 
Semi-annually 23 32.9 47.1 
Quarterly 33 47.1 94.3 
Monthly 3 4.3 98.6 
Other 1 1.4 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
Table 4.11: Board meeting frequency 
 
From the Likert question on dual role of the board chairman and Executive director, the 
respondents strongly agreed that these roles were separated with a mean of 4.4 and a standard 
deviation of 1.082. This response implies that majority of the NGOs have no CEO duality and 
a close cluster of the responses to the mean. The respondents were neutral on the statement that 
board members level of professional qualifications and expertise in financial aspects are 
important and skill deficiencies of board members are considered. In this case the mean was 
3.9 and the standard deviation was 1.144. The respondents were also neutral on the statement 
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that at least one member appointed by major donors sits on the board. In this case the mean 
was 3.57 with a standard deviation of 1.314. This result concurs with the earlier response on 
donor representation where majority indicated donor absence in their boards. This is 
summarized in table 4.12 below. 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
The role of the Chairperson and Executive Director or 
CEO are separated and held by different persons 
70 4.40 1.082 
When selecting board members their level of 
professional qualifications and expertise in financial 
aspects is important and deficiencies in the skills of 
current board members are considered 
70 3.90 1.144 
At least one board member appointed by major donors 
sits on the board 
70 
3.57 1.314 
Table 4.12: Board characteristics Likert responses 
4.5.2 Audit Committee 
The study sought to establish the existence of audit committees, the size, number of members 
with financial expertise and professional accounting qualifications as well as the number of 
independent members. The results indicated that 62.8% of the respondents had audit 
committees while the remaining 37.2% did not have audit committees.  
70.5% of the respondents with audit committees had audit committees with 1-5 members, 
22.7% had 6-10 members, while 6.8% had more than 10 members. 88.6% of the respondents 
reported the presence of 1-5 audit committee members with financial expertise, while 11.4% 
had 6-10 members with financial expertise. 4.5% of the NGOs with audit committees had no 
independent members, while 86.3% had 1-5 independent members. 6.8% had 6-10 independent 
audit committee members while 2.4% had more than 10 independent members on their audit 










  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
AC Presence Yes 44 62.8 62.8 
No 26 37.2 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
AC size 1-5 members 31 70.5 70.4 
6-10 
members 
10 22.7 93.1 
More than 10 
members 
3 6.8 100.0 
Total 44 100.0   
AC Finance 
expertise 
1-5 members 39 88.6 88.6 
6-10 
members 
5 11.4 100.0 
Total 44 100.0   
AC 
Independence 
None 2 4.5 4.5 
1-5 members 38 86.3 90.8 
6-10 
members 
3 6.8 97.6 
More than 10 
members 
1 2.4 100.0 
Total 44 100.0   
  
Table 4.13: Audit committee characteristics 
 
The respondents agreed to the statement that the audit committee is appointed by the board 
with a mean of 4.6 and a standard deviation of 1.134. They also concurred with the statement 
that the audit committee members are independent non-executive directors as indicated by the 
mean of 4.37 and standard deviation of 1.241. They strongly agreed that at least one member 
of the audit committee has the relevant financial qualifications/experience from the mean score 
of 4.9 and standard deviation of 0.801. The mean score of 4.73 and standard deviation of 0.962 
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indicate that the respondents strongly agreed that the audit committee monitors the integrity of 
the financial statements, monitors and reviews the effectiveness and independence of the 
external auditor and objectivity of the audit procedure. The respondents were neutral on 
whether the audit committee meets external and internal auditors in the absence of management 
to review any issues arising from the audit and its submission. This is based on the mean score 
of 3.86 and standard deviation of 1.506. The low standard deviations show that the responses 
were closely clustered around the mean. 
 
 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
The audit committee is appointed by the board 70 4.60 1.134 
The audit committee members are independent non-executive 
directors 
70 4.37 1.241 
At least one member of the audit committee has the required 
financial qualifications/experience 
70 4.90 0.801 
The audit committee monitors the integrity of the financial 
statements, reviews and monitors the external auditor’s 
independence and objectivity and the effectiveness of the audit 
process 
70 4.73 0.962 
Audit committee meets the external/or internal auditors in the 
absence of management to deliberate on any issues arising from 
the audit and submission  
70 3.86 1.506 
Table 4.14: Audit committee Likert responses 
4.5.3 Auditor Type 
The study sought to establish whether the respondents are audited annually by the big 4 audit 
firms and if audit reports are submitted to the NGO Bureau with the annual returns. Majority 
of the respondents represented by 95.7% are audited annually and submit audit reports annually 
to the NGO Bureau. The remaining 4.3% are not audited annually and do not submit annual 
audit reports to NGO Bureau.  
The study also revealed that many NGOs are not audited by the big 4 audit firms. 57.1% of the 
respondents are audited by other firms while 14.3% are audited by Deloitte. KPMG audits 
12.9%, while PWC audits 10%. Ernst & Young audit 5.7% of the respondents. This indicates 
that the size of the audit firm is not an important factor as the NGOs consider competent firms 
capable of undertaking audits within their budgets.  
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The respondents were required to indicate whether they submitted audit reports together with 
returns to the NGO bureau annually. 92.9% reported that they submitted audited accounts with 
the returns while 7.1% did not submit audited accounts with annual returns to the NGO Bureau. 
The NGOs responded on whether organizations audited by the Big 4 audit firms were less 
susceptible to fraud than those that were not. 54.3% were in agreement with this statement 
while 44.3% disagreed with this statement. One respondent representing 1.4% was not sure. 
These results contradict other results above on the number of NGOs audited by the big audit 
firms in comparison with the small firms. Table 4.18 below provides the details. 
 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Annual audit Yes 67 95.7 95.7 
No 3 4.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
Audit firms KPMG 9 12.9 12.9 
PWC 7 10.0 22.9 
Deloitte 10 14.3 37.1 
Ernst & Young 4 5.7 42.9 
Other 40 57.1 100.0 




Yes 65 92.9 92.9 
No 5 7.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
Fraud 
susceptibility  
Not sure 1 1.4 1.4 
Yes 38 54.3 55.7 
No 31 44.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
 
Table 4.15: Annual audit and Audit quality 
4.5.4 Internal Audit Function 
The study sought to establish the existence of an internal audit function in the respondent 
organizations as well as the level of education and years of experience of the head of internal 
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audit. Majority of the respondents at 67.1% indicated the existence of an internal audit 
department while the remaining 32.9% had no internal audit function.  
76.6% of the respondents with internal audit had 1-5 members in the department. 23.4% had 
internal audit departments with 6-10 members. Many of those with no internal audit 
departments reported budget constraints as the main reason for not having an internal audit 
department.  
 
The study further sought to establish the level of qualification of the head of internal audit 
department. 2.1% had heads of internal audit with Master’s degree only with no professional 
accounting qualifications. 4.3% had internal audit heads with undergraduate degrees, while 
38.3% had both undergraduate degrees and professional qualifications. 55.3% had internal 
audit department heads with Masters Degrees and professional accounting qualifications.  
 
40.4% of the respondents had internal audit heads with 6-10 years of experience. This is 
followed by 11-15 years by 25.6% of the respondents and more than 15 years’ experience as 
reported by 17%. Another 17% had internal audit heads with between 1-5years experience. 
These results imply that the heads of internal audit in the respondent NGOs are experienced 


















  Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Internal Audit presence 
Yes 47 67.1 67.1 
No 23 32.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
Internal Audit 
department size 
1-5 members 36 76.6 76.6 
6-10 members 11 23.4 100.0 
Total 47 100.0   
Internal Audit head 
years of experience 
Undergraduate 2 4.3 4.3 
Undergraduate & 
professional 
18 38.3 42.6 
Masters 1 2.1 44.7 
Masters & professional 26 55.3 100.0 
Total 47 100.0   
Internal Audit head 
years of experience 
1-5 years 8 17.0 17.0 
6-10 years 19 40.4 57.4 
11-15 years 12 25.6 83.0 
More than 15 years 8 17.0 100.0 
Total 70 100.0   
 
Table 4.16: Internal audit characteristics 
4.6 Regression between Employee Fraud Frequency and Corporate Governance 
Practices 
The study sought to determine the relationship between employee fraud frequency and 
corporate governance practices. Ordinal regression was used to achieve this objective. An 
ordinal scale with 6 points was used to measure the dependent variable employee fraud 
frequency. Each respondent was assigned a score based on the reported frequency of the 13 
frauds from 1-6. A score of 6 represented multiple fraud frequency, 5 monthly fraud, 4 quarterly 
fraud, semiannual fraud 3, annual fraud 2 and no fraud 1. 
The independent variables were seven in total and consisted of both continuous as well as 
categorical variables. Board size measured by the number of board members was a categorical 
variable initially divided into four categories. Board size 1 consisted of 2-5 members; board 
size 2 had 6-10 members; board size 3 had 11-15 members, while board 4 had 16 or more 
members. During the regression analysis, the categories were reduced to 2, small boards with 
2-10 members and large boards with more than 10 members. The next variable Board 
independence measured by the presence of independent board members had 2 categories, 
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independent where external members were present and non-independent where there were no 
external members.  The third variable donor presence a categorical variable was measured by 
the presence of donors on the board.  Variable 4 board meeting frequency a continuous variable 
was measured by the number of board meetings held per year. Variable 5 audit committee 
presence a binary variable was measured by the existence or not of audit committees. Variable 
6 on auditor type a binary variable was measured by the use or not of the top 4 audit firms. 
Variable 7 internal audit, was measured by the presence of and features of internal function.  
4.6.1 Ordinal Regression Assumptions Check 
The study used ordinal regression analysis to test the five hypothesis made and to determine 
the relationship between corporate governance and employee fraud frequency. Two of the 
assumptions for ordinal regression were checked before running the regression analysis.  
Ordinal regression requires that the dependent variable should be ordinal with specific levels, 
as a first assumption. The study met this assumption since the dependent variable employee 
fraud frequency was measured on an ordinal scale with 6 points. Multiple fraud frequency had 
the highest value of 6, monthly fraud frequency 5, and quarterly fraud frequency a value of 4. 
Semiannual fraud frequency had a value 3, annual fraud frequency 2 and no fraud had a value 
of 1.   
The second assumption is that there should be one or more independent variables that are 
continuous, ordinal or categorical. This assumption was met, as the study had one continuous 
independent variable, board meeting frequency and six categorical independent variables. The 
six categorical independent variables were Board size with 2 categories (small and large board), 
board independence with 2 categories (independent member present or absent) , donor presence 
with 2 categories (donor present and donor absent), audit committee presence with 2 categories 
( audit committee present and audit committee absent), internal audit presence with 2 categories 
(internal audit present and internal audit absent) and auditor type with 2 categories ( use of big 




4.6.2 Ordinal Regression Analysis of Employee Fraud Frequency and Governance 
Ordinal regression assumes that the relationship between independent variables and the logits 
of the dependent variable are the same across all the logits. The results are a set of parallel 
lines, one for each level of the dependent variable. This is the parallel lines assumption which 
is fulfilled if the observed significance level from the parallel lines output for the change is 
large. The null hypothesis is that the lines are parallel, and that the significance level is large. 
From the ordinal regression results, the parallel line assumption was met since the p value was 





Square df Sig. 
Null Hypothesis 149.017       
General 128.456b 20.561c 40 .995 
Table 4.17: Test of parallel lines 
 
Ordinal regression was used to determine the overall goodness of fit of the final model with 
explanatory variables over the baseline or intercept only model. The study findings indicated a 
chi-square value of 12.752 and p>0.546. This statistically insignificant chi square result 
indicates that the final model with seven corporate governance explanatory variables does not 
give a significant improvement over the intercept only model. This is tabulated below. 
 
Model -2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 172.858       
Final 160.106 12.752 14 .546 
 Table 4.18: Model fitting information 
 
The study results showed a Pearson's chi-square statistic for the model of 239.846 with a 
p>0.683, as well as another chi-square statistic for deviance of 146.583 with a p>1.0. These 
statistics are intended to test whether the observed data are consistent with the fitted model. 
Since the p values for both the chi-square for pearson and deviance are large, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that the data and the model predictions are almost similar and 




 Table 4.19: Goodness of Fit 
The study sought to determine how much of the dependent variable employee fraud frequency 
was explained by the seven independent governance variables. The results from the pseudo R2 
statistics indicated values of 0.167 for cox and Snell, 0.179 for NagelKerke and 0.067 for 
McFadden. The value of 0.179 or 17.9% for NagelKerke shows that the seven governance 
variables explain 17.9% of the outcome variable employee fraud frequency. 
 
Table 4.20: Pseudo R-Square 
4.6.3 Hypothesis Testing 
From the literature review, five hypothesis relating employee fraud frequency and 5 
governance practices had been made.  
H1: The size of the board is positively related to employee fraud frequency. 
This results show the estimated coefficient for small board is 1.80. Taking the exponent of this 
to find the Odds Ratio for small boards as the base: exp (1.80) = 6.09. To find the 
complementary Odds Ratio for large boards as the base, the reverse the sign of the coefficient 
before taking the exponent, exp (-1.8) =0.163. The results indicate that a change from small 
boards to large boards increases the odds of experiencing higher employee fraud frequency by 
6.09 or 6 times, a statistically significant effect with P=0.00. Change from large to small boards 
would increase the odds of higher employee fraud frequency by 0.163. This implies that a 
change from a small board to large board is statistically significant, and can lead to higher 
employee fraud frequency, thus indicating that smaller boards are less likely to experience high 
employee fraud frequency. The larger the board, the higher the odds of high employee fraud 
frequency. The positive relationship is in line with hypothesis 1 previously made, as well as 
findings by some researchers (Shan et al., 2013) who found positive relationship between board 
size and probability of fraud in Malaysian firms. Similarly, Berkman et al. 2009 found that the 
Chi-
Square df Sig.
Pearson 239.846 251 .683








size of the board of directors does not play a significant role in preventing fraudulent behavior 
by the management. In nonprofit research, Cornforth (2001) did not find board size to be 
significantly related to board effectiveness. Some researchers have argued that large boards 
tend to increase the probability of fraud as blotted boards become less effective in monitoring 
management (Beasley et al., 2000; Shan et al., 2013).  
H2: The frequency of board meetings is positively related to the frequency of employee 
fraud. 
This results show the estimated coefficient for board meetings 0.083. Taking the exponent of 
this to find the Odds Ratio as the base: exp (0.083) = 1.0865. The results indicate that a unit 
increase in the frequency of board meetings increases the odds of high employee fraud 
frequency, by 1.08 or 1.08 times,  p >0.463. The results imply a positive but insignificant 
relationship between number of board meetings and employee fraud frequency. These results 
are in line with the hypothesis 2, in terms of the positive relationship, though other researchers 
(Chen et al., 2006; Shan et al., 2013), found a statistically significant positive relationship 
between board meetings and fraud. Organizations tend to have frequent board meetings in 
times of distress or in order to deliberate and confront matters of fraud.   
A hypothesis between use of big 4 audit firms and employee fraud frequency had been made 
as follows: 
H3: The use of the Big Four audit firms is negatively related to the employee fraud 
frequency.  
This results show the estimated coefficient for Big 4 audit firms is 0.119. Taking the exponent 
of this to find the Odds Ratio as the base: exp (0.119) = 1.12. To find the complementary Odds 
Ratio for other audit firms as the base, the reverse the sign of the coefficient before taking the 
exponent, exp(-0.119)=0.886. The results indicate that a change from use of Big 4 audit firms 
to other firms increases the odds of experiencing high employee fraud frequency by a factor of 
1.12 or 1.12 times. A change from use of other audit firms to Big 4 audit firms increases the 
odds of high employee fraud frequency by 0.887. Therefore movement from use of Big 4 audit 
firms to other firms increases the odds of high employee fraud frequency more than the 
movement from other firms to the Big 4 firms. This was not statistically significant, with 
p>0.866. This implies that use of big audit firms leads to lower odds of high employee fraud 
frequency, consistent with hypothesis 3. These results are in line with findings by some 
researchers who found negative insignificant relationships between use of big 4 audit firms and 
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fraud in companies (Chen et al., 2006; Shan et al., 2013). In the nonprofit sector, some 
researchers have found positive relationships between auditor size and increased donor funding 
(Kitching, 2009). The results indicate that organizations that use large audit firms also 
experience fraud just as those which use other audit firms for their annual audits. This could be 
due to the fact that audits use sampling and do not vouch 100% of transactions. Consequently, 
auditors might miss out on fraudulent transactions.  
H4: The presence of an audit committee is negatively related to employee fraud 
frequency.  
The literature had also hypothesized a negative relationship between the number of 
independent directors on the audit committee and employee fraud frequency. 
This results show the estimated coefficient for audit committee presence is -0.432. Taking the 
exponent of this to find the Odds Ratio as the base: exp (-0.432) = 0.649. To find the 
complementary Odds Ratio for other audit committee absence as the base, the reverse the sign 
of the coefficient before taking the exponent, exp (0.432) =1.84.The results indicate that a 
change from presence of audit committees to absence of audit committees, increases the odds 
of being in the higher levels of employee fraud frequency by 0.64, or 0.64 times. On the other 
hand, a change from absence of audit committees to presence of audit committees increases the 
odds of high employee fraud frequency by 1.84 or 1.84 times . This was not statistically 
significant, p>0.526. This means that NGOs with audit committees are at higher odds of high 
employee fraud frequency than their counterparts with no audit committees. This findings 
contradicts hypothesis 4 and prior research findings where presence of audit committees have 
been found to deter fraudulent financial reporting (Thiravudi, 2010) and misappropriation of 
assets (Chapple et al., 2009; Mustafa & Ben Youssef, 2010).  
H5: The existence of an internal audit function is negatively associated with employee 
fraud frequency.  
According to prior literature, there is a negative relationship between the presence of the 
internal audit function and fraud. This was the basis for hypothesis 5. 
This results show the estimated coefficient for internal audit presence is 0.121. Taking the 
exponent of this to find the Odds Ratio as the base: exp (0.121) = 1.128. To find the 
complementary Odds Ratio for internal audit absence as the base, the reverse sign of the 
coefficient before taking the exponent, exp (-0.121) =0.886. The results indicate that a change 
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from presence of an internal audit function to absence of the internal audit function increases 
the odds of being in the higher levels of employee fraud frequency by a factor of 1.12, or 1.12 
times. On the contrary, a change from absence of internal audit function to presence of internal 
audit increases the odds of high employee frequency 0.886 times. This was not statistically 
significant with p>0.84. This means that NGOs with internal audit functions are at lower odds 
of experiencing higher employee fraud frequency than those without. These results are in line 
with hypothesis 5 and prior research findings where Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2005) found no significant relation between establishing an internal audit function and a 
decrease in the discretionary accruals level. The Treadway Commission (1987, 37-39) 




















No fraud 5.166 2.370  1 .000 4.702 5.631 
Annual fraud 5.215 2.374  1 .000 4.750 5.680 
Semiannual 
fraud 
5.223 2.375  1 .000 4.758 5.689 
Quarterly 
fraud 
5.259 2.381  1 .000 4.793 5.726 






.083 .113 1.0865 1 .463 -.139 .305 
small board 1.8081 1.049 6.09 1 .000 1.6026 2.0137 
Large board 0a     0       
Independent 
board 




0a     0       
Donor present .498 .529 1.354 1 .347 -.539 1.536 
Donor absent 0a     0       
present Audit 
Committee 
-.432 .682 0.649 1 .526 -1.769 .905 
absent Audit 
Committee 
0a     0       
Internal Audit 
present 
.121 .602 1.128 1 .840 -1.058 1.301 
Internal Audit 
absent 
0a     0       
Big 4 audit 
firm 
.119 .705 1.12 1 .866 -1.263 1.502 
Other audit 
firm 
0a     0       
 




4.6.4 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
The study analyzed the data obtained in order to test five hypothesis on the relationship between 
governance practices and employee fraud frequency. The results indicated that a positive 
relationship between board size, board independence, meeting frequency and employee fraud 
frequency in line with Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. The results were not significant. The findings 
contradicted Hypothesis 4, indicating a positive relationship between presence of audit 
committees and employee fraud frequency. The overall model was not statistically significant 




CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides discussion of research findings, summary, conclusion and 
recommendation of the main findings on the study. The study was on the assessment of the 
relationship between employee fraud frequency and corporate governance practices in NGOs 
in Kenya. The chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 details the summary of the findings, 
section 5.3 conclusions and 5.4 recommendations for practice and policy. Section 5.5 discusses 
the study limitations while section 5.6 gives the recommendations for future studies. 
5.2 Discussion of Findings 
The aim of the study was to assess the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and employee fraud frequency in NGOs in Kenya. The research findings on the frauds most 
committed by employees contradicts prior study findings. There are some similarities and 
contradictions in the governance practices as well as in the relationship between the individual 
governance variables and employee fraud frequency as discussed below.  
5.2.1 Employee Fraud Frequency 
The study found that majority of the respondent NGOs reported employee fraud at multiple 
frequencies. Local NGOs experienced more frequent employee fraud as compared to the 
International NGOs. Many NGOs that have been in operation for longer experience employee 
fraud more frequently than those that have been in operation for fewer years. This implies that 
NGOs are vulnerable to fraud as reported by some researchers (Archambeault et al., 2014), and 
that NGOs have reported more incidents of fraud involving employees (BDO, 2014). NGOs 
have experienced employee fraud, even though some do not want it disclosed for fear of loss 
of reputation and donor funding.  
The most frequently reported fraud was personal use of organization assets, followed by 
overstated expense reports and expense report fraud. The least frequently occurring fraud was 
forged cheques. These findings differ from other research findings which reported cash as the 
most commonly misappropriated asset (Greenlee et al., 2007; Greenlee et al., 2006). A survey 
by ACFE, (2014) found check tampering to be the most perpetrated fraud. In this case forged 
cheques was the least frequent fraud. This finding could be attributed to more security features 
in cheque printing and use where cheque alterations are not allowed previously introduced by 
the Central Bank of Kenya. 
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From the Likert scale responses on fraud, majority of the respondents were neutral with the 
statement that cash is the most misappropriated asset. This finding is contrary to prior findings 
in the USA that both found cash to be the most misappropriated asset (Archambeault et al., 
2014; Greenlee et al., 2007; Greenlee et al., 2006). The study found out that the respondents 
did not think that male employees commit more frauds than their female counterparts as elicited 
by the responses to the Likert questions. This implies that both male and female employees are 
likely to perpetrate fraud. Similarly, the respondents were neutral as to whether senior level 
employees commit more frauds than junior staff. These findings are contrary to findings by 
some researchers who found more fraud committed by female employees and managers 
(Greenlee et al., 2006) . The respondents disagreed with the statement that most frauds are 
committed by accounting staff than non-accounting staff. This implies that non accounting staff 
commit more frauds than accounting staff.   
5.2.2 Corporate Governance Practice Findings  
This study also sought to establish which corporate governance practices exist in Kenyan 
NGOs, from a list of seven governance practices mentioned in literature. The findings indicate 
that about one third of the respondent NGOs had large boards of directors consisting of 11-15 
members. Another one third had boards consisting of 6-10 members. This implies that about 
two thirds of the respondent NGOs had boards with at least 6 and at most 15 members. Some 
researchers propose that a nonprofit board should not exceed ten members in order to prevent 
the chief executive from dominating the board (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; and Jensen, 1993). 
The upper limit of 15 members from the findings would be acceptable as proposed by some 
researchers who see the ability to raise resources in larger boards than smaller boards 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). This however contradicts other research suggestions where it 
is argued that where the board of directors is too large, there is a risk of domination of trustees 
by an inner core in the charity sector (Beasley, 1996). There is no one size that fits all 
proposition of the optimal board size, the Charity Commission suggests that a board of at least 
three and nine at most is adequate. Decision making can be problematic where boards are too 
large, and conversely small boards can also get overworked (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
The findings also indicated that the respondent NGOs had independent boards. This finding is 
in line with good governance practice (Beasley, 1996; Uzun et al., 2004). This means that 




The research findings indicate the absence of donors on NGO boards of directors, as reported 
by majority of the This finding is contrary to propositions by some researchers who argue that 
the presence of donors on the board can be a deterrent to fraud (Andrés-alonso & Romero-
merino, 2006). Many donors tend not to sit on the BOD of the recipient organizations in order 
not to meddle in the decision making of the organizations. 
The study results indicate that the boards of majority of the respondents meet quarterly and 
semiannually. These findings are similar to that by Ouna (2012) which found board meeting 
frequency to be quarterly. The findings imply that NGO boards do not meet too frequently as 
frequent board meetings could signal problems in the NGOs.  According to Shan et al (2013), 
frequent board meetings may be held during financial distress or when controversial decisions 
need to be made on illegal or questionable activities.  
Kenyan NGOs exercise separation of the role of the Executive director and chairman of the 
board as elicited by the research findings. This response implies that majority of the NGOs 
have no CEO duality. Similar findings have been obtained in other studies by Meme (2012) 
and Ouna (2014), who found no CEO duality in governance studies on NGOs in Somalia 
consortium and NGOs in Kenya.  The research findings indicate that Kenyan NGOs value level 
of professional qualifications and expertise in financial aspects of the directors on the BOD. 
The study found that donors do not sit on the BOD of the recipient organizations as reported 
by majority of the respondents. This result contradicts propositions by Andres et al (2006) on 
having major donors on the BOD to monitor the performance of management. The finding is 
in line with the earlier response on donor representation where majority indicated donor 
absence on their boards.  
The study found that majority of Kenyan NGOs have set up audit committees, mainly 
consisting of between 1-5 members. This indicates that many NGOs have adopted this 
governance practice, a finding similar to that of Ouna (2014).  The audit committees also 
consisted of members with financial and accounting expertise as reported by 89% of the 
respondents.  This finding is in line with good practice recommended by SEC, (2002) and can 
be effective in reducing fraud as proposed by some researchers (Mustafa & Ben Youssef, 2010; 
Shan et al., 2013; Thiravudi, 2010).  
The study findings indicate that majority of the respondents were not audited by the big 4 audit 
firms. This finding is in line with  findings by some researchers which found no significant 
relationship between use of large audit firms as a measure of audit quality and fraud (Chen et 
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al., 2006; Shan et al., 2013). Some Kenyan NGOs are not able to afford the high audit fees 
charged by the big 4 firms, while others believe that smaller credible audit firms are equally 
competent in conducting credible audits. Moreover, there have been instances where large audit 
firms such as Andersen have been implicated in fraud, thereby eroding credibility of the large 
audit firms to an extent. Majority of the respondents submit annual audited accounts with the 
annual returns to the NGO bureau as required by the Kenyan law.  
The study further revealed that majority of the respondents had internal audit departments with 
between 1-5 members, implying small internal audit departments. The study further shows that 
the internal audit departments were run by department heads with masters’ degrees and 
professional accounting qualifications. Majority of the respondents had a minimum of 6 years’ 
experience. These findings mean that Kenyan NGOs have adopted the use of internal audit and 
employ qualified personnel to run the internal audit function. This is in line with suggestions 
by some researchers who view the presence of internal audit as a key fraud deterrent (Coram 
et al., 2006). Some regulatory bodies such as The Treadway Commission emphasized the 
importance of ensuring the integrity of financial reporting by establishing internal audit 
practice. 
5.2.3 Relationship between Employee Fraud Frequency and Governance Practices  
Five hypothesis based on literature had earlier been made on how the dependent variable 
employee fraud frequency relates to five dependent variables. 
The findings of the study show that NGOs with large boards are at higher odds of experiencing 
high employee fraud frequency, which is in line with hypothesis 1. This finding concurs with 
other research results by some researchers (Shan et al., 2013) who found positive but 
statistically insignificant relationship between board size and likelihood of fraud in Malaysian 
firms. Similarly Berkman et al 2009, found that the size of the board of directors does not play 
a significant role in preventing fraudulent behavior by the management. In nonprofit research, 
Cornforth (2001) did not find board size to be significantly related to board effectiveness. The 
study findings imply that employee fraud frequency would be lower where the board size is 
small board. Some researchers have argued that large boards tend to increase the probability of 
fraud as blotted boards become less effective in monitoring management (Beasley et al., 2000; 
Shan et al., 2013).  Large boards also tend to have communication problems making it difficult 
to reach decisions (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Thus larger boards would therefore be less 
capable of giving attention to employee fraud. 
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The study results show higher odds of experiencing high employee fraud frequency when the 
number of board meetings increase. These results are in line with the hypothesis 2, as well as 
findings by other researchers who found a positive relationship between board meetings and 
fraud (Chen et al., 2006; Shan et al., 2013). Shan et al (2013) argued that the number of board 
meetings required are likely to be higher during times of fraudulent activities. Similarly, Chen 
et al (2006) suggests that companies have more board meetings during times of financial 
distress or when decisions on illegal and questionable activities need to be made. 
 
The research findings show that a change from use of Big 4 audit firms to other firms increases 
the odds of experiencing high employee fraud frequency, consistent with hypothesis 3. These 
results contradict findings by some researchers who found positive relationships between use 
of big 4 audit firms and fraud in companies (Chen et al., 2006; Law, 2011; Lennox, 2010; Shan 
et al., 2013). The research results are consistent with results from a study by Ramayanti & 
Irianto (2009) that found a positive relationship between audit quality and presence of fraud in 
Indonesian firms. In the nonprofit sector, some researchers such as Kitching (2009) found 
positive relationships between auditor size and increased donor funding. The explanation for 
the results could be that organizations that use large audit firms also experience fraud just as 
those which use other audit firms for their annual audits. This could be due to the fact that 
external audits use sampling and do not examine 100% of the transactions and might miss out 
on fraudulent transactions.  
 
The study found that change from absence of audit committees to presence of audit committees 
increases the odds of high employee fraud frequency. This finding contradicts hypothesis 4 and 
prior literature where presence of independent directors on the audit committees were found to 
deter fraudulent financial reporting (Thiravudi, 2010) and misappropriation of assets (Chapple 
et al., 2009; Mustafa & Ben Youssef, 2010). An audit committee with many independent 
members might not lead to less employee fraud as some independent members may assume 
that the others are vigilant thereby becoming less diligent in their duties. 
The results indicate that a change from presence of an internal audit function to absence of the 
internal audit function increases the odds of high employee fraud frequency. This implies that 
employee fraud frequency will be higher where there is no internal audit function. These results 
are in line with hypothesis 5, but contrary to findings by some researchers who found no 
significant relation between voluntarily setting up an internal audit function and a decreased 
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levels of discretionary accruals (Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2005). The study 
findings are consistent with those by some researchers who found that organizations with an 
internal audit function were more likely to detect fraud within their organizations than those 
without such a function (Coram et al., 2006). The Treadway Commission (1987, 37-39) 
identified internal audit as a function that is critical to the integrity of financial reporting. 
The results show that a change from board independence to no independence increases the odds 
of high employee fraud frequency. This implies that NGOs without independent boards are at 
greater odds of high employee fraud frequency than their counterparts with independent boards. 
These findings are consistent with other research findings which have found a negative 
relationships between independent directors and fraud in Malaysian companies(Shan et al., 
2013), and possibility of earnings restatements and independent directors (Agrawal & Chadha, 
2005). The results show that board independence is insignificant in explaining employee fraud 
frequency, contrary to findings by other researchers who have found board independence to be 
significant in reducing fraud (Bourke, 2006; Chen et al., 2006; Farber, 2005; Uzun et al., 2004).  
The results indicate that a change from presence of donors on the board to absence increases 
the odds of high employee fraud frequency, though insignificant. This finding is in line with 
study results by Alonso & Romero (2006), where the presence of donors was found to improve 
donations to recipients and monitor management. This finding implies that the presence of 
donors on the board is effective in reducing employee fraud frequency.  
The study found that the final model with seven corporate governance explanatory variables 
does not give a significant improvement over the intercept only model.  The findings further 
show that the seven governance variables only explain part of the outcome variable employee 
fraud frequency, and were not significant.  
5.3 Summary of Findings 
In summary, the study results show that employee fraud exists in Kenyan NGOs, and that 
personal use of assets, inventory theft and expense report fraud are the most frequently 
encountered frauds. Cheque payee alterations was the least frequent fraud possibly due to 
increased security features in cheque printing and restrictions on cheque alterations. 
Majority of the respondents concurred with the opinion that cash is the most misappropriated 
asset. The study findings indicate that gender is not a factor when it comes to perpetration of 
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fraud. Similarly, the findings indicate neutrality on whether accounting staff commit more 
frauds than non-accounting staff.  
Most of the Kenyan NGOs use most of the seven governance variables under study. The NGOs 
have boards of directors with 6-15 members and mainly meet on quarterly and semiannual 
basis. The NGO boards are independent due to the presence of 2-5 independent members. 
Donors are not represented on the boards of most NGOs as this is generally not a requirement 
by the donors. The NGO boards have no CEO duality and comprise of qualified members with 
financial expertise. 
 Majority of the NGOs do not use large audit firms as the large firms are not a deterrent to 
fraud. This finding implies that many NGOs do not equate audit firm size with reduced fraud 
incidents as elicited by some researchers. Some large audit firms such as Anderson and 
company were accused of irregularities which led to the collapse of Enron. 
Some of the NGOs have set up audit committees, a practice common in companies especially 
in the USA where audit committees are mandatory. NGOs in Kenya are not obliged to establish 
audit committees, yet they have adopted this as part of good practice. The NGOs have internal 
audit function in place, headed by qualified and experienced personnel. NGOs that have no 
internal audit function cited lack of resources to set up the function.    
The overall regression model was insignificant in explaining the relationship between 
employee fraud frequency and the governance variables. One variable, board size was 
significant in explaining the odds of high employee fraud frequency.  
5.4 Conclusions 
The study concludes that board size significantly affects employee fraud frequency in NGOs. 
Large boards have been associated with fraud due to poor communication leading to poorer 
oversight over management. Small boards are important in deterring employee fraud as they 
tend to be more efficient in monitoring management in Kenya NGOs.  
The presence of audit committees increases the odds of high employee fraud frequency. This 
is contrary to prior research findings which advocate for establishment of audit committees by 
NGOs.   
The study further concludes that some key governance practices proposed by some researchers 
for good practice in deterring fraud are insignificant in explaining employee fraud frequency. 
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Board meeting frequency, use of big 4 audit firms, presence of external directors, donor 
presence and presence of internal audit function show little power in explaining employee fraud 
frequency.  
5.5 Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
The study focused on the relationship between corporate governance practices and employee 
fraud frequency. The findings of the study indicate that NGOs experienced fraud at different 
times and most likely have borne the burden of the cost of fraud. Fraud subjects many 
organizations to high losses if left unchecked and can jeopardize the ability of NGOs to raise 
funds for their projects. 
Board size was significant in explaining employee fraud frequency. Small boards consisting of 
a maximum of 10 members had lower odds of high employee fraud frequency than those with 
more than 10 members. NGOs should set up boards with a maximum of 10 members, since 
small boards are more effective in monitoring management, and will be instrumental in 
reducing employee fraud. 
The presence of audit committees was found to increase the odds of high employee fraud 
frequency. NGOs should not feel coerced to set up audit committees to reduce fraud frequency, 
as this might not reduce employee fraud frequency. They can consider other practices such as 
strengthening the board.  
Governance has been recommended as useful in deterring fraud as part of good practice. The 
study showed that NGOs use most of the governance practices under study and still experience 
employee fraud at varying frequencies. In addition to good governance practices, alternative 
measures should be used to deter fraud such as tone at the top, whistle blower policies, strong 
compliance programs and conducting fraud risk assessments.  
The NGO sector regulators such as the NGO coordination bureau can help NGOs by stipulating 
a maximum board size of 10 members. Large boards with more than 10 members have been 





5.6 Limitations of the Study 
The study was founded on agency and institutional theories, from which the governance 
variables were derived. Therefore the governance variables focused on the monitoring role of 
the board from agency theory, leaving out the incentive based side where agents are given 
incentives to encourage them to act on behalf of the principal. The variables were focused on 
board characteristics and audit, and would be different if incentive alignment in agency theory 
and other theories such as stakeholder and resource dependence would have been used. In the 
case of stakeholder theory the governance variables would have focused on other stakeholders 
such as community beneficiaries. The scope of the study was therefore limited by the use of 
agency and institutional theory. 
There was a challenge in obtaining responses from many NGOs on the sample, resulting in a 
low response rate. This might have had an impact on regression results obtained. Different 
results might have been obtained if the response rate had been higher.  
In addition, some respondents who indicated that no fraud had occurred in their organizations 
might have provided favorable responses in fear of tainting their integrity and being viewed as 
fraudulent. Fraud is a sensitive topic and many NGOs shy away from disclosing its existence 
for fear of losing credibility with the donor community and beneficiary communities they 
serve. Consequently, some of the favorable responses might not be a true representation of the 
actual situation of fraud in those NGOs.   
Communication with the respondents was difficult since many contact details provided by the 
NGO coordination bureau as well as the sampled NGOs websites were outdated. This made 
the data collection process very slow and necessitated substituting some selected NGOs with 
new ones. 
5.7 Suggestions for Further Study 
Due to difficulty in obtaining information on fraud, this study focused on employee fraud 
frequency only while leaving out other types of fraud namely financial statement fraud and 
corruption. Future studies can consider the extent of these frauds in NGOs in order to come up 
with recommendations on policy improvement by regulators.  
The study also used questionnaires as the primary source of data. Future studies can consider 
using both questionnaires and other data collection tools such interviews and focus group 
discussions where available to determine the extent of fraud.  
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Most of the governance practices proposed by literature in monitoring management were 
insignificant in explaining employee fraud frequency, except board size. Future studies can 
broaden the scope and definition of governance to include definition of roles, responsibilities, 
and balance of power, among executives, directors, and stakeholders.  
The ordinal regression model could explain 17.9% of the dependent variable, indicating that 
82.1% of the variance in the employee fraud frequency could be explained by other aspects not 
covered in this study, proper internal controls, roles and responsibilities of boards, tone at the 
top, establishment and adherence to whistle blower policies. These can form the basis for 
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APPENDIX II: Questionnaire 
 
ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES AND EMPLOYEE FRAUD IN NONGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS IN KENYA. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The information provided here will be used solely for academic purposes and will be treated 
with utmost confidentiality. 
Instructions 
Please answer the following questions in Section A, B, C and D, by placing a tick (√) 
in the space provided or by filling in the necessary details in the spaces provided. 
 
SECTION A: BASIC INFORMATION 
 
1. Age of the organization ___________________________ 
0 – 5 years [   ]     6 – 10 years [   ]    11 – 15 years [   ]  16 years and above [   ] 
 
2. Position held in the organization  
Management [   ]  other (specify) ____________________ 
 
3. Type of organization 
     Local (Kenyan) NGO [    ] 
     International NGO      [    ] 
     Other [    ] (please specify) __________________________________ 
 
4. Core business of the organization. 
     Health                                  [    ] 
     Democracy & Governance                  [    ] 
     Education & Youth                              [    ] 
     Agriculture, Business & Environment [    ] 
     Natural Resource Management            [    ] 
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     Other (specify)            [    ] 
_______________________________ 
 
SECTION B: FREQUENCY OF EMPLOYEE FRAUD IN NGOs 
This section aims at determining the type of frauds and frequency or number of fraud 
incidences in NGOs. Please tick the boxes as appropriate. 




annually Annually None 
Theft of cash on hand      
Theft of cash deposits      
Unrecorded sales      
Understated sales      
Forged cheques      
Payment to ghost workers      
Theft of inventory      
Theft of fixed assets      
Overpayment of employees      
Overstated expense reports      
Altered cheque payee      
Falsified wages      
Multiple expense report 
reimbursements 
     
Fraudulent invoices      
Personal use of organization 
assets e.g. vehicles. 
     
 
   
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements based on 
a scale of 1 to 5. 















4. Cash is the most commonly misappropriated asset      
5. Male employees commit more frauds than their female 
counterparts 
     
6. Senior level employees commit more frauds than junior staff      
7. Most frauds are committed by accounting staff than non-
accounting staff 
     
 
 
SECTION C: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN NGOs. 
This section aims at determining corporate governance practices in NGOs in Kenya.  
 
Board Size and Composition 
1. How many members currently serve on your organizations ‘Board of 
Directors? 
            2 – 5 [   ]  6 – 10 [   ]  11 – 15 [   ]  16 and above [   ] 
2. How many independent board members are currently present on your BOD? 
(An independent director is one who does not take part in the day to day running of 
the NGO). 
2 – 5 [   ]  6 – 10 [   ]  11 – 15 [   ]  16 and above [   ] 
 
3. How frequently does the board meet in a year?  
Once a year [    ]  Semiannually [   ]  Quarterly [    ] Monthly [  ]   
Other [  ] Specify___________________ 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements based on 
a scale of 1 to 5. 
 















11. The role of the Chairperson of the Board and Executive Director 
or Chief Executive Officer are separated and held by different 
persons 
     
12. When selecting board members their level of professional 
qualifications and expertise in financial aspects is important and 
deficiencies in the skills of current board members are considered 
     
13. There are more male board members than female board members      
14. At least one board member appointed by major donors sits on the 
board 
     
 
Audit committee 
15. Do you have an audit committee? (Tick as appropriate) 
Yes [  ]  No [  ] Why not? _____________________________ 
16. How many members sit on the audit committee? _________________ 
   1 - 5 members [  ]  6 – 10 members [  ] More than 10 members [  ]                   
17. How many audit committee members possess financial expertise and 
professional     accounting qualifications? 
   1 - 5 members [  ]  6 – 10 members [  ] More than 10 members [  ]                   
18. How many independent members sit on the audit committee? 
   1 - 5 members [  ]  6 – 10 members [  ] More than 10 members [  ]                   
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements based on 
a scale of 1 to 5. 
Key:  1-Strongly Disagree   2-Disagree   3-Neutral    4-Agree   5-Strongly Agree 
 










20. The audit committee is appointed by the board      
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21. The audit committee members are independent non-executive 
directors 
     
22. At least one member of the audit committee has the relevant 
financial qualifications/experience 
     
23. The audit committee monitors the integrity of the financial 
statements, reviews and monitors the external auditor’s 
independence and objectivity and the effectiveness of the audit 
process 
     
24. Audit committee meets the external and/or internal auditors 
without management to discuss matters relating to its submission 
and any issues arising from the audit 
     
 
Audit quality 
25. Is your organization audited on an annual basis? (Tick as appropriate) 
      Yes [  ]   No [  ] Why not? _____________________________ 
26. Which accounting firm conducts the annual audit? (Tick as appropriate) 
KPMG [  ]   PriceWaterhouseCoopers [  ] Deloitte [  ] Ernst & Young [  ]
                  other [  ] Please specify.   
27. The audit report and accounts are submitted to the NGO Bureau with annual 
returns. 
      Yes [  ]  No [  ] Why not? _____________________________ 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements based on 
a scale of 1 to 5. 
Key:  1-Strongly Disagree   2-Disagree   3-Neutral    4-Agree   5-Strongly Agree 
 












Organizations audited by one of the big 4 audit firms are less 
susceptible to fraud. 





29. Does your organization have an internal audit departments? 
      Yes [  ]   No [  ]  why not   
30. Does your organization have an internal auditor?                  
         Yes [  ]   No [  ] why not   
31. How many staff work in the internal audit department? 
     1 - 5 members [  ]  6 – 10 members [  ] More than 10 members [  ]                   
32. How many years of audit experience does the internal auditor have? 
     1 - 5 years [  ]  6 – 10 years [  ] 11 – 15 years [  ] More than 15 years [  ] 
33. What qualifications does the head of internal audit have? 
      Undergraduate [  ]    
      Undergraduate & professional qualification [  ]   
      Master’s degree [  ] 
       Master’s degree & professional qualification [  ]      









APPENDIX III: List of NGOS 
1. Act Change Transform 
2. Action Aid International Kenya 
3. ActionAid International-Africa Regional Office 
4. Adventist Development And Relief Agency - Kenya 
5. Africa Centre For Leadership And Missions 
6. Africa Health Information Channel ( Ahic ) 
7. Africa Muslims Agency - Kenya 
8. African Family Health 
9. African Institute Of Deaf Studies And Research 
10. African Leadership And Reconciliation Ministries 
11. African Youth Rejuvenation Network 
12. Afrilink Entrepreneurs International - Kenya 
13. Afya Research Africa 
14. Agency For Development And Aid 
15. Agrisystems Foundation 
16. Ahadi - Kenya 
17. All Kenya Women Federation 
18. Amici Del Mondo World Friends - Onlus 
19. Amka-Space For Women's Creativity 
20. Amoud Foundation  
21. Angels Of Hope Organization  
22. Anti-Drug International Organization 
23. Arid life Development Agency 
24. Asego Green Forestry Organization 
25. Asilia Africa  
26. Barwaqa Relief Organization 
27. Bridges Development Agency 
28. British Institute In Eastern Africa 
29. Building Africa 
30. Call Africa 
31. Camp Counsellors Africa 
32. Care International 
33. Caring Neighbors  
34. Caritas Switzerland 
35. Catholic Relief Services 
36. Centre For Education And Professional Exchange  
37. Centre For Media And Information Literacy In Kenya 
38. Centre For Women And Children International 
39. Centre Of Excellence In Development 
40. Child Connect Africa  
41. Childfund Kenya 
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42. Children International Kenya 
43. Citizens Awareness Network 
44. Civic Enlightenment Network 
45. Community Effort For Development 
46. Community Health Access Program 
47. Community Multi Development 
48. Community Nurturing International 
49. Community Oriented Project Support (Copso) 
50. Community Road Empowerment 
51. Community Smile International  
52. Companionship Of Works Association 
53. Concern Worldwide 
54. Crescent Medical Aid Kenya 
55. Deborah Amoi Foundation 
56. Deco International (Kenya Chapter) 
57. Diakonie Emergency Aid 
58. Diaspora Renaissance Initiative 
59. Disability Caucus For Empowerment And Development  
60. Donatamarie Learning Centre  
61. Dry Lands Management Programme 
62. East Africa Centre For Research And Advocacy On Developmental Disability  
63. Eastern Community Development Programme 
64. Eco-Growth Development Organization 
65. Economic And Social Rights Centre - Hakijamii 
66. Ecumenical Pharmaceutical Network 
67. Education And Reconstruction Development Organization 
68. Education Beyond Borders Kenya 
69. Empower Africa 
70. Energy, Environment And Development Network For Africa 
71. Engender Health 
72. Enkishui Water And Sanitation Initiative 
73. European Committee For Agricultural Training 
74. Families Support Foundation Kenya 
75. Family Health Options Kenya 
76. Filmaid - Kenya 
77. Finn Church Aid Kenya 
78. Flying Kites Kinangop Children’s Centre  
79. Foundation For Human Rights And Resources Monitoring 
80. Furaha Organization For Care Upkeep, Shelter For Children 
81. German Agro Action 
82. Global Alliance For Africa 
83. Global Children International 
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84. Glory Wonder Organization  
85. Goal Ireland 
86. Goldenlife International Foundation 
87. Grace Development Foundation  
88. Green Solutions Organization  
89. Growth Partners Africa 
90. Handicap International 
91. Harun Otwoma Foundation 
92. Heifer Project International 
93. Help Reach Africa 
94. Helpage International 
95. Human Development International Organization 
96. Humanity For Orphans ,Youth And Widows Initiatives Kenya 
97. Ignitors Centre For Peace And Development 
98. Imani Rehabilitation Agency 
99. Integrated Rural Growth Initiatives 
100. International Youth Fellowship - Kenya 
101. Intersos Kenya 
102. Into Abbas Arms 
103. Ipas Africa Alliance 
104. Irene Limika Foundation 
105. Jacaranda Development Initiative 
106. Jacaranda Women Empowerment Project 
107. Jani Jipya Initiative 
108. Jisaidie Development Network 
109. Kaimba Youth Initiative 
110. Kenya Association Of Professional Counsellors (Kapc) 
111. Kenya Consortium To Fight Aids, Tuberculosis And Malaria 
112. Kenya Consumers' Organization 
113. Kenya Friends For The Needy 
114. Kenya Medical Women's Association 
115. Kenya Network Of Women With Aids (Kenwa) 
116. Kenya Orphans Support Organization 
117. Kenya Restoration International 
118. Kickstart International Inc. Kenya 
119. Korea International Volunteer Organization 
120. Korea Project On International Agriculture 
121. Kujenga Maisha East Africa 
122. Latter Day Saint Charities 
123. Life And Peace Institute 
124. Life Bridge Network 
125. Lutheran World Federation Department For World Services 
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126. Lutheran World Relief East And Southern Africa Regional Office 
127. Mabawa Empowerment Organization Kenya 
128. Maisha Mapya Initiative 
129. Maisha Yetu 
130. Malteser-Germany 
131. Marie Stopes Kenya 
132. Mbithi Memorial Education Centre 
133. Medecins Du Monde (France) 
134. Medecins Sans Frontieres - Switzerland 
135. Medecins Sans Frontieres Belgium 
136. Medecins Sans Frontiers - France 
137. Medicenes Sans Frontieres - Spain 
138. Medicins Sans Frontireres - Belgium 
139. Megabridge Foundation 
140. Michael Chege Njoroge Foundation  
141. Micronutrient Initiative Kenya 
142. Moses Otunga Foundation 
143. Mothers 2 Mothers Kenya 
144. Mountain View Conservation Programme 
145. Mubarak For Relief And Development Organization 
146. Multy Touch International 
147. Network Of African Science Academies  
148. Northern Education And Environmental Development Organization 
149. Oasis Rehabilitation Centre (International ) 
150. Ongoza Initiative Kenya 
151. Opening Village Doors Foundation 
152. Organization For Assisting Hearing Impaired Persons 
153. Overseas Social Services International  
154. Pamoja Road Safety Initiative 
155. Pan African Climate Justice Alliance 
156. Passion To Illuminate Pathways 
157. Peace Promoters Forum 
158. People For Peace Kenya 
159. Plan International 
160. Planned Parenthood Federation Of America-International Africa Regional Office 
(Ppfa-I/Aro) 
161. Platform For Land Use Sustainability - Kenya 
162. Popote Tupo Organization  
163. Positive Exposure -Kenya  
164. Positive Transformation Initiative 
165. Potential Enhancement Awareness Programme 
166. Prisoners Care Programme 
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167. Programme Against Malnutrition 
168. Programmes For Education And Scholarships 
169. Prosperity Micro Credit Development Initiative 
170. Pure Love Expressed Health Care International 
171. Rachuonyo Integrated Outreach Programme 
172. Rafiki Multipliers Of Information Initiative 
173. Reach The Destitute For Better Destiny 
174. Red R U K 
175. Refuge Point International 
176. Regional Organization On Resource Based Conflicts 
177. Rekebisho 
178. Resource Institute For Community And Human Development Agency 
179. Reverse Momentum Foundation Inc 
180. Richard Turfosa Orero Foundation 
181. Rightspan For Social Economic Equality  
182. Rise Above Tribe 
183. Rivers Of Mercy Programme 
184. Rural Health Needs Kenya  
185. Sage Organization  
186. Salitogenesis Services Programme 
187. Samaritan Organization For Advocacy And Empowerment 
188. Samaritans Purse International Relief 
189. Saru Youth And Children Network 
190. Save The Children Fund (Uk) 
191. Save The Children International (Kenya) 
192. Servizio Volontario International - Kenya (The International Voluntary Service - 
Kenya) 
193. Shalom Centre For Counselling And Development 
194. Sight Savers International  
195. Smile Of Africa 
196. Social Ministry Research Network Centre 
197. Socio-Economic Rights & Advocacy Centre 
198. Sokoni Women's Development Initiative 
199. SOS Children's Village Kenya 
200. SOS Kinderdorf International 
201. Sports For Life Programme 
202. Success Educational Programme 
203. Sustainable Development For All - Kenya 
204. Sustainable Development Solution 
205. Sustainable Health Care Foundation 
206. Swahili Heritage 
207. Tabasamu Afya Organization 
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208. Take Heart Association Project 
209. Tatua Kenya Project  
210. Teach A Child Africa-Kenya Chapter 
211. Terre Des Hommes Netherlands 
212. Terry Child Support And Youth Resource Centre 
213. The Healthcare Improvement Initiative 
214. The Junior Shelters 
215. The Kalonzo Musyoka Foundation 
216. The Kenya National Committee For The Prevention Of Alcoholism And Drug 
Dependency 
217. The Woman’s Hope Organization  
218. Therapeutic Rescue International 
219. Transformation Community Initiatives 
220. Trocaire  
221. Tula Education Foundation 
222. Tunegeni Youth Support International 
223. Tushinde Children's Trust 
224. Universal Generation For The Advancement Of Gender And Development  
225. University Of Washington Global Assistance Program Kenya  
226. Usalama Children’s Centre 
227. Users And Survivors Of Psychiatry In Kenya 
228. Ushindi Development Foundation 
229. Uzima Foundation Africa 
230. Veterinaires Sans Frontieres (Vsf-Germany) 
231. Veterinaires Sans Frontieres(Switzerland) 
232. Veterinaries Sans Frontiers (Vsf) Switzerland 
233. Vetworks Eastern Africa 
234. Vijana Against Aids And Drug Abuse  
Source: NGO Coordination Bureau, 2016 
 
